Australia 1 England 3: 2023 World Cup tactical analysis

England reached their first Women's World Cup final with an impressively controlled performance against Australia. In front of a hostile crowd of 75,784 at Sydney's Stadium Australia, the Lionesses demonstrated their growth under Sarina Wiegman's leadership to deservedly overcome the spirited host nation.

Wiegman's only loss with England in her previous 37 matches in charge was a 2-0 defeat to Australia six months beforehand. Here, her team was ruthless, with Ella Toone, Lauren Hemp and Alessia Russo taking chances at key moments, either side of Sam Kerr's stunning second half equaliser.

“They were more clinical than us,” said Australia coach Tony Gustavsson. “We told [the players] at half-time to be more confident on the ball and play the way we can play. When we started to do that we dominated the game but unfortunately it didn't pay off with enough goals tonight.”

England's coach reflected on the qualities that underpinned her team's victory. “We can adapt to situations we haven’t been in before,” said Wiegman. “That also has to do with some very experienced players and a lot of intelligence in the team.” 

Here, our coaching experts have analysed that adaptability, picking out three tactical highlights from an historic occasion for English football…

Three key tactical points

England’s left side combinations

England operated in a 3-4-1-2, with Australia’s 4-4-2 mid and low blocks allowing plenty of early possession for the opposition. England's left side central defender Alex Greenwood stepped forward and connected with penetrative runs from Toone as the 10, or Georgia Stanway from her double pivot role (below). These runs tested the Australian back four, allowing England’s two centre-forwards, Russo and Hemp, to drop into midfield and connect with their forward-running teammates.

England had most success on their left side. As Greenwood continued to step forward with the ball, one of England's centre-forwards would widen on to Australia’s right-back (below). This created space for left wing-back Rachel Daly to receive unmarked, either directly from Greenwood, or via a third-player bounce from the double pivot. With Russo or Hemp widening, Toone still had space to provide her own forward runs as the number 10, eventually latching onto the ball inside the penalty area to put England ahead via a superb strike into the top corner.

In the second half, England's left side combinations were stifled by a lack of space and time on the ball. In Australia’s 4-4-2, their right midfielder Hayley Raso dropped significantly deeper, tracking the runs of Daly (below). From here, Australia’s right-back could cover England’s widening central forward, or Toone's runs. As a result, Greenwood advanced higher with the ball, well into Australia's half. In turn, this gave more space for Australia’s two central forwards to counter against England’s back line, which became a detached pairing as Greenwood advanced. This was seen when Kerr broke to score Australia's equaliser.

Attempts to overload England’s wing-backs

Australia’s 4-4-2 focused on quick counter attacks from their mid and low blocks. When they had spells of sustained possession, Gustavsson's team looked to overload England’s wing-backs via overlapping runs from left-back Stephanie Catley (below) and right-back Ellie Carpenter. Whenever Australian forwards Kerr and Mary Fowler moved towards the ball, they occupied England’s two closest centre-backs, and occasionally took their marker into midfield. Width held by Australia’s two wide midfielders – Caitlin Foord on the left and Raso on the right – drew out England’s wing-backs, isolating them in a two v one, creating space for Catley and Carpenter to overlap unmarked and cross. In these moments, Australia's wide midfielder on the far side narrowed and got into the box.

England then adapted their defensive positioning by having one of their central midfielders mark Fowler or Kerr when they dropped into midfield (below). If the centre-forward high up the pitch (Kerr in the example below) didn't position themselves around or on England’s closest centre-back to the ball, Australia’s wide overload disappeared. As one of Australia’s full-backs overlapped, and England’s wing-back jumped out to press, any overlapping run was then covered by England’s free, wide centre-back.

England’s tweak to a 3-5-2

England adapted again in the second period, changing to more of a 3-5-2 without the ball and on the attacking transition. As Australia moved the ball towards their full-backs, England’s midfield trio of Stanway, Walsh and Toone (below) could press higher, no longer relying on the wing-back to jump out. Instead, number eights Toone and Stanway moved out, with England putting pressure on the first or second touches of Australia's full-backs. Even when the home side worked the ball into their wide midfielders, such as substitute Cortnee Vine (below), England's eights nullified the possibility of overloads. This allowed the Lionesses' wide centre-backs to remain narrow, rather than covering their wing-back.

The 3-5-2 was also evident when Australia lost possession in England's half, as the hosts piled on pressure looking for an equaliser at 2-1 down. Hemp and Russo stayed higher as they were no longer required to back press on Australia's full-backs. There, they could secure clearances, long balls or forward passes, combining and progressing England up the pitch. This was an excellent example of managing the game while maintaining an attacking threat (below).

Runs from Stanway and Toone late in the game supported Russo and Hemp, who connected well compared to the isolation of Australia’s forwards in attack. England's defensive adaptation nullified much of Australia’s late attacking potential and allowed Russo to get the third goal, capping a memorable performance and result for Wiegman’s team.

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