‘Exceptional’: Liverpool v Manchester City tactical analysis

The second 1-1 draw of the season between Liverpool and Manchester City – the two teams that, between them, have claimed the last six Premier League titles – ensured that the 2023/24 race remains tight with only 10 games remaining.

The real winners from this pulsating encounter were arguably Arsenal, whose late victory over Brentford 24 hours earlier was enough for Mikel Arteta and his team to sit top on goal difference. It looked like they would be yielding that spot to Pep Guardiola and Manchester City for much of the first half at Anfield, however. The visitors started the stronger and took a deserved lead from a training-ground move, as John Stones flicked home a Kevin De Bruyne corner at the near post.

Liverpool came out firing for the second half, though, and one moment turned the game on its head. Alex Mac Allister equalised from the penalty spot, after Darwin Núñez pounced on a short Nathan Aké backpass and drew a wild foul from Ederson. Jürgen Klopp’s team were relentless thereafter, with Luis Díaz failing to convert any of three excellent opportunities and Núñez thwarted at point-blank range by replacement goalkeeper Stefan Ortega.

Despite this turnaround, City had chances to steal all three points. Phil Foden should have done better when put through one on one against Caoimhín Kelleher, and Jérémy Doku struck the inside of the far post with a rasping shot. Instead, the spoils were shared in what could be the final Premier League meeting of two of its greatest managers.  

How the managers saw it

“Today I saw the best 53 minutes we had against Manchester City,” said Klopp, whose team became the first since Arsenal in October to have the majority of possession in a game against City. “It was exceptional how we played, and important as well that we learned that about ourselves as well. There is no higher scale than playing your best football against City, and creating the chances we created against them: counter-attacks, quick thinking, shots from distance. How we played through their midfield was some of the best coaching moments of my career.”

“We spoke at half-time about defending something in this stadium and then we gave away a penalty,” said Guardiola. “For 15 to 20 minutes after that it was like a tsunami, oh my God, but when Mateo [Kovacic] came on we had quality to keep the ball again. We tried to play.”

The City manager also addressed his conversation with a visibly frustrated De Bruyne, after the Belgian was substituted midway through the second half. “It’s good if he’s upset,” said Guardiola. “The decision was taken because I knew what we were missing. We were not keeping the ball and after [the substitution] we did better.

“Listen, we need Kevin and he is really important for us. He was involved in the first half, but after we gave them the goal the game was not in our hands. We needed to get back to our level. That was the idea.”

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches highlight the key tactical themes from an extremely high-level encounter at Anfield…

The 3-2-4-1 shape

Both teams converted into a 3-2-4-1 shape with the ball. Out of possession, they defended in a 4-4-2, with Manchester City moving Stones into midfield as a second pivot. City built by waiting for one of Liverpool’s central midfielders to commit to pressing, creating the 4-4-2 shape and forcing the rest of Liverpool’s midfield line to flatten. This allowed their number 10s, Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne, to reposition higher into bigger spaces.

Virgil van Dijk looked to cover De Bruyne where possible, as the Belgian ghosted away from Wataru Endo. Liverpool’s back line then shifted across, often leaving either Silva or Julián Álvarez – who was used wide on the left – free to create a significant portion of their dangerous attacks (below).

One issue Manchester City had with changing shape came when they failed to secure the ball cleanly from direct Liverpool play. The visitors’ player-oriented approach, with their converted back three, often won the first contact against the hosts’ front line, especially on balls towards Núñez. But whenever Liverpool's midfield regained the second ball, they often found their front line anyway. They then targeted the wide spaces around City’s temporary back three. During these transitions, Kyle Walker was particularly tested by Liverpool’s attackers, as he was forced to defend relatively large spaces (below).

Liverpool also used a 3-2-4-1 shape during sustained possession, converting into a 4-4-2 when defending. Their converting involved Bradley moving extremely high from right-back, leaving a back three behind him. Harvey Elliott then moved inside to support Díaz and Dominik Szoboszlai around Núñez, with Mac Allister and Endo creating the double pivot.

Most of Liverpool’s best build-up came via their right-side rotations, especially as Álvarez jumped out to press Jarell Quansah. Bradley’s dangerous crossing, Elliott’s supportive combinations and Núñez’s penetrative runs all threatened an often isolated Aké (below).

There were multiple moments when Álvarez’s unco-ordinated pressing on Liverpool’s back line created room for Bradley to advance higher, contributing to the change in momentum toward Liverpool. However, with Bradley so high when Liverpool attacked, this left space for Álvarez to exploit upon a City regain. De Bruyne and/or Silva also worked across as secondary support, ready to find Erling Haaland in the penalty area. This made it unrealistic for Bradley to defend counter-attacks on this side, with City’s wide counters a threat throughout the first half (below).

Second-half adaptations

In the second half, Manchester City adapted their defensive shape in light of Liverpool’s right-sided threat. Álvarez tracked the advancing runs of Bradley, with Aké jumping up to cover Elliott. From here, Aké was no longer underloaded, as Liverpool’s right side barely combined for a significant period of the second half. Instead, Liverpool played delicate, well-placed balls in behind City’s back line, with Silva jumping out of central midfield to press Quansah. This allowed the host’s front line to threaten beyond, which put significant pressure on City’s often staggered back line (below).

Mo Salah was then added to Liverpool’s right side, with Joe Gomez moved to right-back as Andy Robertson came on at left-back. Gomez looked to invert where possible, purely to get Salah isolated against Aké. Here, the Egyptian repeatedly worked through balls into Núñez, who ran the right inside channel, or the narrowed left-winger in Díaz (below).

The latter had multiple chances to win the game for the home side, providing constant runs inside and around Walker. Indeed, Liverpool’s ability to create following middle-third regains, or quickly combine as a front line, helped them to dominate for a lengthy period after equalising.

Guardiola reacts

Seeking to stem the tide, Guardiola removed De Bruyne and Álvarez, bringing on Jérémy Doku and Mateo Kovacic. Silva then moved wide right and Foden went inside as one of the number 10s around Haaland. Silva’s support and energy helped deal with Robertson’s overlapping, while helping Walker deal with Díaz on occasion. Kovacic added much needed control in the midfield for City, but their lack of runs in behind Liverpool’s back line remained an issue. These runs were not frequent enough to stretch the home side’s back four, nor create enhanced pockets for City’s 10s to operate in. Instead, the majority of City movements around the player in possession were back towards the ball (below).

As a result, Liverpool’s midfield unit were excellent in duelling and regaining possession, as the spaces they had to manage were much smaller. Although Doku hit a post late on, City created little of note compared to the home side, but were resilient enough to secure a point.

It was perhaps a fitting result, for both a game and an era of high-quality encounters between two supremely coached teams. 

To learn more from professional coaches at The Coaches’ Voice, visit CV Academy