Aston Villa 2 Liverpool 2: tactical analysis

Arne Slot and Liverpool edged further ahead of Arsenal in the Premier League with this hard-fought draw at a bouncing Villa Park. Unai Emery had expressed frustration with this fixture being brought forward to accommodate Liverpool’s League Cup final against Newcastle in March, but his side came the width of a post away from claiming a late win that would have seen them close the gap on the top four to a mere three points.

Proceedings had started well enough for Liverpool, who went ahead on the half-hour as Diogo Jota picked up a loose back-pass from Andrés García to square for Mo Salah – who else? – to score his 24th Premier League goal of the season. The impressive Youri Tielemans equalised within 10 minutes, finishing well at the second phase of a set-piece, before Villa secured a half-time lead through Ollie Watkins’ clinical header.

Liverpool fought back after the break, and equalised through a deflected Trent Alexander-Arnold shot just past the hour – they have now scored at least two goals on eight consecutive league visits to Villa Park. Substitute Darwin Núñez missed a glorious late chance to win the game for the visitors, before Villa’s late rally almost saw three points go the other way. The result puts Liverpool eight points clear at the top, having now played one game more than their title rivals.

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches dissect the key tactical points from an entertaining clash…

How the managers saw it

“Liverpool is the best team in the Premier League and the best team in the Champions League, but we competed,” said Emery. “We showed our capacity to face them, and more or less to get close to the victory.

“The result is very fair for both teams, because they had chances and we had a good chance at the end, and in the last 10-20 minutes we maybe deserved more. I am positive, this draw is adding one point to the table – not enough, but you have to keep going.”

“If you go away to Villa, that’s always a difficult fixture,” said Slot. “So ­performance-wise, not a dip at all today, in my opinion. What we must not do – and we’ve done a bit too often now – is we don’t get what we deserve. If you look at all the chances and put them in a row, from us and from them, I think it’s clear which team should have won.

“We must not make a habit out of that, because it’s happened a bit too much now. But still we are eight points clear of Arsenal.”

A battle of box midfields

Aston Villa nominally set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, with Morgan Rogers and Marcus Rashford as wide attackers and Marco Asensio operating as the number 10 behind Ollie Watkins. Rogers quickly moved inside from the right, however, to work as a second number 10. This created space into which right-back Andrés García could push forward and deliver crosses from out wide.

With Rogers moving inside, Asensio shifted into the left inside channel. There, he could support Rashford, who held the width on the left, and play alongside Rogers at the top of a midfield box, ahead of a double pivot formed by John McGinn and Youri Tielemans (below).

Left-back Lucas Digne still looked to overlap from deep and target the space behind Mo Salah, who remained high and rarely positioned himself alongside the rest of the midfield unit in the Liverpool block.

Liverpool also started in a 4-2-3-1 formation, with Ryan Gravenberch and Alexis Mac Allister in a familiar double pivot. Curtis Jones and Mo Salah began either side of Dominik Szoboszlai in an attacking line behind number nine Diogo Jota. But Arne Slot’s team also converted into a box midfield, with Jones moving inside from the left (below).

This created space for Andy Robertson to advance, with Salah holding the width on the right. This left the visitors with a converted back three, although Mac Allister regularly dropped into the false full-back space left by Robertson. This worked to draw his marker higher, creating more space for Jones inside, Robertson around or Jota high.

Threat from the Villa left

Despite the two teams’ similar attacking structures, Villa’s forward play differed slightly. Liverpool defended with a deeper back line inside their own half, so the home side required more delicate combinations to break through. This usually came on the Villa left, where Digne continued to overlap – largely unchallenged by Salah – from deep. Initially Rashford and Asensio combined on this side, but Rogers swapped over for a period – and he was joined by Watkins as Villa’s attackers totally committed to this part of the pitch (below). One subtle combination released the unattached Digne to cross for Watkins, who ran into the box freely after linking play to head the hosts in front on the stroke of half-time.

Liverpool targeting in behind

Liverpool had taken the lead after capitalising on a mistake from García – forced by an effective high press – in the Villa back line. Their attacking approach differed from their opponents, however. They looked to deliver much more direct passes that targeted the bigger spaces Villa left in behind their much higher back line. 

Jota was particularly threatening when running beyond, especially when the gap widened between full-back and centre-back (below). Because Villa’s central midfielders tightly marked Liverpool’s converted number 10s closest to the ball – see McGinn on Curtis Jones in the example below – the full-backs had to be ready to jump into the wide areas. This provided ideal gaps to run into, and for Liverpool to then target with passes. Jota should have restored Liverpool’s lead from one such moment soon after Villa had equalised from a set-piece.

Liverpool’s second-half changes

In the second half, Liverpool committed an extra body forward to their attacks, working numbers between the lines for more dangerous central combinations. The majority of their play started on their right side, with Salah dominating his 1v1 moments against Digne. This eventually dragged extra Villa players over, creating central gaps for the visitors to exploit. Initially, Gravenberch made forward runs into this space from deep (below), to support alongside Szoboszlai and Jota. Trent Alexander-Arnold would then move higher to cover for this additional run, and on occasion be the one to join the narrowed attack between the lines. His deflected strike from one such move levelled the match, with Liverpool creating a significant number of attempts on Villa’s goal.

Right-side rotations

Alexander-Arnold and Jota were then withdrawn, with Conor Bradley (who ultimately left the game through injury) introduced to provide support from deep on Liverpool’s right. His incisive pass found a run in behind from Szoboszlai, who unselfishly squared for substitute Darwin Núñez to miss desperately from close range. Continued runs forward or wide from Szoboszlai allowed Salah to rotate inside to exploit the space between Digne and Tyrone Mings (below), with Liverpool’s tweaks on their right side providing a steady stream of attacking moments and locking Villa into their own half. 

Although the home side rallied and ended the game stronger, Liverpool created double their number of attempts on goal. It was the lack of a killer touch in the box that arguably cost them the victory.

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