Xabi Alonso’s coaching career analysed

When Jürgen Klopp announced he would be leaving Liverpool at the end of the 2023/24 season, Xabi Alonso immediately became the leading name linked with the job. Soon after, Thomas Tuchel confirmed he would be leaving Bayern Munich, and the German giants were not shy in making their interest in Alonso clear. As a player, the Spaniard had played with some distinction for both Liverpool and Bayern. Now, as a head coach, he has seriously impressed in the first few seasons of his managerial career.

But neither Liverpool nor Bayern were able to tempt Alonso to leave. Instead, he announced his intention to stay with Leverkusen into the 2024/25 campaign. “I am convinced it is the right decision, I am happy,” said Alonso. “The players gave me so many reasons to keep believing in the team - for their commitment, for their desire, for their hunger to have a great season. My job is not over here.” Alonso’s Leverkusen duly went on to win their first-ever Bundesliga title, with five games to spare.

Basque-born, Alonso began both his playing and coaching career with his local La Liga club, Real Sociedad. When Rafael Benítez took over as Liverpool manager in 2004, he wasted no time in signing Alonso the player. Mature beyond his years, as a young midfielder he hit the ground running in the Premier League at the age of 22. A goal in the ultimately victorious 2005 Champions League final capped a remarkable first season with Liverpool.

After five years, 210 games and an FA Cup win in the English game, he moved to Real Madrid, where he won another Champions League and the Spanish title. Three Bundesliga trophies followed with Bayern Munich, not to mention a World Cup and two European Championships with Spain.

After his retirement in 2017, Alonso completed the UEFA Elite coaching course alongside Xavi, and returned to Real Madrid to coach their Under-14s. In 2019, he went back to another of his previous clubs, becoming head coach of Real Sociedad B, in Spain’s third tier. He duly guided them to promotion to the Segunda División, although they were relegated in his final season.

In October 2022 he took over Bayer Leverkusen, who at that time were second from bottom after eight Bundesliga games. By the end of the season, Alonso’s Leverkusen had finished sixth — qualifying for the Europa League — and reached the semi finals of that same competition. By the winter break of the 2023/24 season, Leverkusen were top, the only one of 96 clubs in Europe’s top five leagues to remain unbeaten. In fact, they had not lost in any of their 25 competitive fixtures to that point (22 wins, three draws), setting a new German record.

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed Xabi Alonso’s coaching career, highlighting some key aspects of the tactical approaches Alonso has taken during his managerial career with Leverkusen and Real Sociedad B… 

Central transitions

At Real Sociedad B, Alonso initially utilised 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 shapes. His side excelled at efficiently progressing to goal, especially through the central spaces. This came from high pressing in the opposition’s half, or aggressive midfield counter-pressing, regaining possession to then drive forward and penetrate in behind.

They were also capable of building from deeper — still with forward-thinking combinations to progress through the thirds — before capitalising on their central numbers in the opposition half.

From the 4-2-3-1, one of the double pivots would push forward and join the number 10. That gave two central players to support and link with the single centre-forward.

With a 4-3-3, Alonso had a shape that already possessed two advanced central midfielders, who would initially widen to connect with the wingers. This widening also created space for a centre-back or full-back to carry the ball forward centrally, working around the single pivot.

As the ball progressed forward, the number eights narrowed by providing runs inside. This was, in essence, a repositioning as two number 10s, forming a close, narrow trio between the lines (below). In both the 4-3-3 and the 4-2-3-1 shapes with Sociedad B, the wingers held the width for as long as possible.

In Alonso’s first season with Bayer Leverkusen, his side recorded the second-lowest number of crosses in the Bundesliga. This indicated his preference for penetrating and progressing centrally. Alonso also shifted to a more permanent 3-4-3 shape at Leverkusen. Within this, he could either deploy two number 10s, with the width provided by the wing-backs, or a flatter front trio with the wing-backs then supporting deeper and narrower.

Either way, Alonso’s Leverkusen have been among the Bundesliga’s leading teams for dribbles and 1v1 moments in the 2023/24 season. As with his Sociedad team, they have showcased a preference and ability to drive and progress quickly through opposing lines and spaces.

Despite Leverkusen not being a crossing team, they have made use of their widest players in the front line in transition. This has especially been the case when using a flatter front-line trio in a 3-4-3, and when their central players have had limited space to continue progressing forward.

The 3-4-3 formation

After playing a 3-4-3 in his final season with Sociedad B, Alonso has used this shape extensively at Leverkusen, albeit not immediately. His Sociedad B progressed the ball forward with speed. The front-line trio would connect through central areas, often making narrowed runs from their wider starting positions. They would also rotate, as the central forward swapped roles and positions with the wide attacker (below).

This made the wingers’ movements harder to track, predict and cover, as they rolled inside. From here, the double pivot and advancing wing-backs worked the ball into the narrow trio as efficiently as possible. The front three would be high, central and often flat.

With Leverkusen, the 3-4-3 structure mirrored that of Sociedad, with a purposeful front three combining inside. In 2022/23, that involved the likes of Moussa Diaby, Amine Adli and Callum Hudson-Odoi working around and off the shoulder of the centre-forward — Adam Hložek or Patrik Schick — with wing-backs Mitchel Bakker and Jeremie Frimpong providing overlapping support when needed. Leverkusen’s right side was particularly progressive, with Diaby’s dribbling and 1v1 threat impressive when carrying the ball forward or attacking in behind. Frimpong offered a dribbling threat at right wing-back, allowing Diaby to become a second forward on occasion.

Unlike Sociedad, Leverkusen also created a box midfield, with the two 10s dropping and combining ahead of the double pivot of Robert Andrich and Exequiel Palacios (below). This often overloaded the opposing central midfield, but also allowed the wing-backs to advance into higher positions — especially Frimpong on the right, who offered key passes as well as ball carries.

Moving into 2023/24, Alonso has moved to a more permanent 3-4-2-1 shape, as opposed to the flatter 3-4-3 structure. The penetrative movements and direct combinations of the front line have been replaced by more intricate sequences.

Florian Wirtz and Jonas Hofmann have also been permanent number 10s, ahead of Palacios and Granit Xhaka as the double pivot. Frimpong has continued to attack from right wing-back, with the positive and attack-minded Álex Grimaldo on the left.

Alonso has increased his team's wide threat on both sides of the pitch while maintaining the threat and combinations around single centre-forward Victor Boniface. This adapted shape and personnel changes have allowed Leverkusen to dominate the ball for longer spells, increasing their average possession to 59 per cent after 18 games of the 2023/24 Bundesliga.

Central counter-pressing

In order to transition effectively from the central spaces, Alonso’s Sociedad side aggressively counter-pressed in the central areas, with narrowing wingers supporting the midfield trio (below). The double pivot screened central passes but aggressively jumped forward, especially when one didn’t have a player to mark.

From here, the narrowed wingers would cut off diagonal passes into the wide areas, with the highest of the attacking midfielders aggressively hunting for the ball. Where possible, the centre-forward back-pressed into midfield, but also screened passes backwards, locking the ball central for longer. The midfielders would then hunt for it.

Despite averaging 51 per cent possession in the 2022/23 Bundesliga, Alonso’s Leverkusen didn’t counter-press as aggressively or as consistently. Instead, they had the third-highest passes per defensive action, and the lowest combined duels, interceptions and tackles per minute of opposition possession. The 3-4-3 system naturally recovered into a back-five shape. In order to allow the wing-backs to fully recover — especially on Leverkusen’s right side — the midfield unit often delayed the ball. They did this by jumping out to apply pressure and stop immediate forward play, rather than seeking the high regains seen at Sociedad B.

Leverkusen still looked to force mistakes through the centre of the pitch. Should the opposite try to play around, Alonso’s team would attempt to lock the ball towards the touchline. With a back-five block in place, wide pressing could occur. Even if the wing-back on the side of the ball decided to continue pressing, the back four could slide across to cover, still able to lock the play one way.

Compact defensive block

After Alonso had got Sociedad B promoted to a higher level, they utilised compact blocks to defend for significantly longer periods, given that they were no longer able to aggressively counter-press as often as in the third tier. At Sociedad, the 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3 shapes were then set in mid-blocks, dropping into a low block only when appropriate or forced to.

The number 10 or one of the advanced central midfielders would often jump forward to join the single forward in the first line, attempting to limit access into the opposing pivot players. As the ball was forced wider, the pairing of winger and full-back jumped out to press. The gap between centre-back and full-back would be covered by one of the deeper midfielders. But in order for this to occur, the winger on the far side of the ball had to be narrow and cover around, allowing the midfielders to drop back when needed (below).

Alonso also began using a back five in his final year with Sociedad, setting the template for his time with Leverkusen. A significant aspect of their superb start to the 2023/24 Bundesliga has been Leverkusen’s ability to score first. In their initial 18 matches, they scored the first goal on 14 occasions. Alonso has then had more flexibility with his game plan, giving the possibility to defend in a more compact block and counter against opposition chasing the game.

Leverkusen’s organised block has often become a 5-2-3, with the two 10s narrowing alongside centre-forward Boniface (below). This limits central access, as seen with Sociedad, giving Leverkusen lots of defensive numbers, but also a solid platform to centrally transition and combine. The wing-backs aggressively jump out to press, as seen with the full-backs at Sociedad, but with Leverkusen’s back five it has been rare that the double pivot is needed to cover.

The pivots jumping out, with appropriate cover in behind, has allowed Frimpong and Grimaldo to fully commit to the press, placing them in dangerous positions on a regain. The central defenders are more than capable of covering the wide areas when needed, but have also been aggressive in their 1v1 defending. In a set block, the double pivots' duelling has added an important defensive presence should opponents progress – especially inside the jumping wing-backs.

Alonso’s results in his first 18 months with Leverkusen have been difficult to argue with. He has shown a tactical awareness that have made them a difficult team to play against, as well as efficient in their attacking play. Furthermore, he has marked himself out as a coach whose approach merits close observation. 

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