Jürgen Klopp
Liverpool, 2015-2024
Jürgen Klopp’s immense impact in nine seasons as Liverpool manager can be measured in several ways. Trophies — most notably a first league title in 30 years — have been plentiful. There have been many memorable games, not least the 2019 Champions League semi final second leg against Barcelona (explained, tactically, by his assistant Pep Lijnders, below). Then there is his connection with the red half of Liverpool, where he was awarded the Freedom of the City in 2022. Underpinning all of this, though, has been the swashbuckling style in which his Liverpool teams have played.
Back in his Borussia Dortmund days, Klopp explained the difference between his favoured style of play and that of Arsène Wenger: “He likes having the ball, playing football, passes. It’s like an orchestra. But it’s a silent song. I like heavy metal more. I always want it loud.”
The ‘heavy metal football’ tag stuck with Klopp, but what has it meant in practice at Anfield? Here, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed Liverpool’s tactical evolution under their German manager, picking out key features of his teams between 2015 and 2024.
Counter-pressing
Klopp replaced Brendan Rodgers in October 2015, and immediately implemented a style similar to that seen at Dortmund. His time in the Bundesliga had been marked by aggressive counter-pressing, efficient regains and strong duelling, coupled with purposeful attacking football.
Liverpool ended Klopp’s debut season as the highest-ranked team for defensive duels in the Premier League, having significantly improved on the same metric under Rodgers. They also registered the third-highest total defensive duels, which was to become a key staple of Klopp’s initial playing style at Anfield.
These successful duels were often seen in the moments when Liverpool lost the ball. Naturally, this stopped the opposition from creating counter-attacks, but Liverpool also used these moments as an attacking tool of their own.
Opponents began to open up after initially regaining the ball from Klopp’s side, with multiple individuals moving into new positions or spaces. With Liverpool often regaining the ball quickly, they were in positions to take advantage of emerging spaces.
The 4-2-3-1 formation was Klopp’s initial preferred structure in 2015/16, before moving to a 4-3-3 for the following seasons (below). The duelling of Emre Can, James Milner and Adam Lallana gave Liverpool an aggressive and committed counter-pressing midfield unit in that first season, coupled with the back-pressing of Roberto Firmino.
Georginio Wijnaldum (#5, above) joined in July 2016, from relegated Newcastle United, as Jordan Henderson (#14) established himself in central midfield. This gave Liverpool two superb number eights in Klopp’s 4-3-3, who supported the counter-pressing of a front line made up of Firmino (#11), Sadio Mané (#19) and Philippe Coutinho (#10). Importantly, they also worked back tirelessly to cover any gaps in front of, or between, the back four.
Transitional attacks
Klopp’s arrival didn’t immediately improve the number of goals conceded, despite his side’s successful duelling. What did significantly improve was the threat on transition. Liverpool ended 2015/16 as the second-highest scorers in the 29 league-match period for which Klopp was in charge. They were only 14th when he arrived.
Liverpool averaged around 60 per cent possession in the following two seasons, 2016/17 and 2017/18. But it was their attacking transitions, with Mané, Coutinho and Firmino, that made them such an attacking force. Mo Salah’s arrival in 2017 added to their transitional threat; the Egyptian scored 32 Premier League goals in his debut season. The counter-pressing midfield was still in full flow, further enabling Liverpool’s dangerous front line to capitalise on regains in the opposition half.
The dropping of Firmino (now #9, above) was important in how Liverpool attacked, connecting into the penetrative movements from Salah (11) on the right, and Mané (19) on the left. After regaining possession in midfield, players such as Henderson, Wijnaldum, Milner and Can would purposefully work the ball forward into the front line.
Full-backs
By 2018, Klopp had guided Liverpool to a Champions League final and was well established as manager. He signed Virgil van Dijk in January, with Alisson Becker and Fabinho among the arrivals in the summer that followed.
Moving into the 2018/19 season, his side were still averaging 60 per cent possession or above, with full-backs Trent Alexander-Arnold and Andy Robertson now key figures. These two worked high up the pitch, giving Liverpool an additional edge to their attacks. This complemented Salah and Mané’s dribbles, intelligent positioning and inward runs off the ball, as well as the continued dropping of Firmino. At least one of the midfielders — usually the number eights — would usually also make a forward run (below).
In every season from 2018 to 2023, Liverpool recorded at least the second-most crosses in the Premier League. In that time, it was Alexander-Arnold and Robertson who delivered the most crosses for Klopp’s team. Alexander-Arnold ranked joint-third for assists in the 2018/19 Premier League, with Robertson fifth. In the title-winning campaign that followed, they were second and third respectively – behind only Manchester City playmaker Kevin De Bruyne.
The duo’s frequent crosses, cut-backs and key passes found their clinical central teammates regularly, as Liverpool’s opponents struggled to contain the threat from wide areas. The full-backs’ deliveries from set-pieces were also a valuable element of Klopp’s attack.
To have one full-back threat advancing forward is an attacking plus, but to have two in the same team meant that opponents struggled to contain both. Whenever an opponent attempted to press or force the ball towards one side, the full-back on the far side was afforded more space to provide significant attacking returns. The pair also began to combine directly with one another, via switches of play, showcasing a superb range of passing across the pitch.
That front three
To limit Liverpool’s full-back threat, opponents tracked their wide advances, often with very deep, opposing wingers. In addition, some opponents pressed and forced the play inside, attempting to limit the involvement of Liverpool’s full-backs. At these times, the narrow front line — most commonly Salah, Mané and Firmino — proved their worth. For a period they were probably the most effective front three in world football.
Individually they were outstanding 1v1, which was ideal for breaking a compact, player-oriented system. Salah’s dribbling threat from the right (below) and ability to cut inside created shooting opportunities, but also drew in defenders. This in turn freed Mané, Firmino, the advancing full-backs and any deep runner from midfield.
Firmino would drop to create a midfield overload, from where he would link between the lines and rotate with Wijnaldum, Henderson, Naby Keïta or Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, running the other way. Crucially, his movements pulled and disrupted opposing centre-backs, creating gaps for passes through to Salah and Mané.
Mané was the most direct of this front line, getting in behind with runs (above) as well as direct drives with the ball. Here, he benefited from both Salah’s dribbling and Firmino’s positioning. When these movements or rotations were tightly followed, covered or screened, full-back spaces became available for Alexander-Arnold and Robertson to find the front line anyway.
As well as their individual qualities, this attacking trio also offered potent, often irresistible combinations. They were able to find each other between the lines, both through tight combinations and when attacking on the break. After the full-backs, between 2018 and 2022, Mané, Salah and Firmino often provided the most assists for Liverpool.
Central rotations
Liverpool’s wide areas were fruitful thanks to the work of their full-backs, but also the widening runs from the right-sided number eight Henderson, who worked well around Salah’s inward movements. With Henderson providing more of the width to attack, Alexander-Arnold no longer solely looked to overlap and cross when Liverpool had possession. As a result, Alexander-Arnold would move inside, either becoming the number eight, or occasionally the second pivot. From here, Klopp’s side began to build deep inside their own half, with a converted back line trio and a double pivot.
When attacking higher up the pitch, Alexander-Arnold’s passing range was also notable. He could break the opposition’s back line through incisive through balls, passes round the corner or switches of play. Robertson on the left remained much more suited to overlapping, with Liverpool’s left-sided attacker inverting accordingly. Subsequently, Liverpool’s left-sided number eight — often Curtis Jones in the 2023/24 season — provided widening runs similar to the right side (below).
With Henderson, Mané and Firmino all departing since 2022, more recent examples of central rotations have included Dominik Szoboszlai, as Liverpool’s right-sided number eight, providing the wider support around and ahead of Salah. Compared with Firmino, Darwin Núñez has provided many more central runs in behind, from positions higher up the pitch. Diogo Jota has also been very penetrative with his passing and combinations, especially when positioned between the lines.
Jota and Cody Gakpo have also played the single central-forward role, on occasion dropping short to receive, overload in midfield and pull opposing centre-backs out of line. Both are more penetrative and forward-thinking than Firmino, although neither match the Brazilian for creativity.
As a result of their varying central combinations and attacking play, Liverpool have crossed significantly less in 2023/24 than in any other season since 2018.
Build-up
Another recent evolution in Klopp’s side is how they adapt and tweak their build-up, as they progress through the thirds with controlled possession. That said, they still couple this with effective, purposeful transitions and counter-pressing.
Joining the single pivot — Fabinho in 2022/23, mostly Alexis Mac Allister or Wataru Endo in 2023/24 — Alexander-Arnold has often inverted from right-back, with the rest of the back line forming a temporary trio. This is a 3-2 build, or a 4-2 when Alisson joins — a common set-up in many current top sides (below, with Joe Gomez playing left-back in Robertson’s absence through injury).
Liverpool have been trying to find the balance when advancing into the opposition half. Teams playing this way often maintain the 3-2 structure behind the ball, once they have worked it into the front line. But with Robertson still so influential in the attacking phase, he has continued to get forward. This leaves a 2-2 set-up and less players to protect the counter-attack.
Even without the left-back pushing up, a centre-back needs to defend the wide-right area on transition. As such, opponents with direct, pacy left-wingers can threaten Liverpool more than has previously been the case.
The main strength of this adapted set-up has been placing Alexander-Arnold in a more central, influential area to impact the build-up. He has continued to demonstrate his superb passing range, creating chances by directly connecting into the front line.
Naturally, his crossing has reduced — after 21 Premier League appearances in the 2023/24 season, he had recorded his lowest number of crosses per 90 minutes since 2017. Yet without Firmino’s dropping — and with Núñez providing forward movements and runs in behind — Klopp found a new method of creating central overloads via Alexander-Arnold.
While Klopp may have stayed true to his heavy metal principle throughout his time at Liverpool, the tactical details in the way his team plays has certainly evolved. It will be fascinating to see how his successor builds on that.
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