Edin Terzic tactics and style of play

When Edin Terzic guided Borussia Dortmund to the 2024 Champions League final, it was another feather in the cap of his burgeoning managerial career. In each of his first two and a half seasons in charge, Terzic has had Dortmund challenging for major honours. That was likely no surprise to the German club, who knew he had great coaching potential long before he became a household name.

A lifelong Dortmund fan who grew up 40 kilometres from the Westfalenstadion, Terzic joined as a youth coach and scout in 2010, compiling reports for Jürgen Klopp. He even demonstrated his initiative on one occasion by disguising himself as a steward to watch a closed Real Madrid training session, in order to find out who their penalty-takers were.

Between 2013 and 2017, Terzic broadened his football horizons by working as an assistant to Slaven Bilic, first at Besiktas and then West Ham. As Bilic told The Coaches’ Voice: “I wanted one of those guys who is a coach but also an analyst, so I approached Dortmund’s sporting director, Michael Zorc, who said: ‘We have plans for Edin, big time, but I’m going to loan him to you.’”

Terzic duly returned to Dortmund as an assistant coach in 2017. Then, in December 2020, he took over as interim manager until the end of the season, winning the German Cup to boot. After a season as technical director, he became manager on a permanent basis going into the 2022/23 campaign. That year, Dortmund agonisingly lost the title to Bayern on goal difference on the last day of the season, drawing 2-2 at home against Mainz when a win would have secured top spot.

Terzic and the club bounced back the following season, reaching Wembley after winning a Champions League group of death containing Paris Saint-Germain (PSG), AC Milan and Newcastle United, then eliminating PSV Eindhoven, Atlético Madrid and PSG in the knockouts. Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed the tactics that Terzic has used as head coach of Borussia Dortmund…

In possession: Build-up

Terzic has mostly used 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 formations as Dortmund manager. Favouring a possession-based style of play, his Dortmund averaged 58 per cent possession in his first full season. That put them second in the Bundesliga’s possession rankings in 2022/23.

They have typically built with a back four, including expansive full-backs where possible. Ahead, Terzic has used a single pivot and two eights – positioned in the half-spaces – who are integral to combining with the full-backs, in order to escape pressure on their build. The wide players have the option to roll inside to narrower positions, occupying opposing centre-backs on different lines to full-backs. This provides more central passing options.

An example of Dortmund provoking the opposition press is shown below. Right-side number eight Julien Brandt has used it as a trigger to drop and create space, through deceptive movement and change of speed. There, he has received and bounced into centre-back Niklas Süle, who can then play forward into right-back Thomas Meunier. The narrowed position of right-winger Marius Wolf allows the option of a longer pass, in behind into the space, should the opposition left-back jump to engage. Alternatively, a secondary movement from Brandt, behind his marker, will provide an option to receive behind the opposition’s midfield line.

Against more aggressive opposition, Terzic has shown pragmatism and used third-line solutions to beat the press. This has been in evidence in more competitive fixtures, such as the Champions League, where Dortmund averaged less than 50 per cent possession up to the 2024 final.

Against RB Leipzig in the example below, Dortmund’s full-backs positioned themselves deeper to pull out the opposition’s wide players. The central-midfield trio have dropped to deceive the opposition, drawing them deeper towards the ball, creating space between the opposing defensive and midfield lines. Goalkeeper Gregor Kobel then played a clipped pass into Niclas Füllkrug (below), rather than on to him for a flick-on. Füllkrug could then pin defenders, using his strength and physical attributes to receive against the pressure and combine with supporting players to then progress forwards.

Progressing through midfield

Terzic often wants his team to overload centrally, to dictate possession when progressing. At the same time, Dortmund have shown fluidity within their midfield structure, retaining possession with different tactical shapes.

As a frequent, simple adaptation, Dortmund have dropped their central striker into the space behind, as well as between, the opposition’s midfield. This is to create a central numerical advantage to play through. In these situations, the player dropping will look to receive on the back foot with an open body, to then travel forwards or slide passes into wide players, who will dribble 1v1 or attack the space in behind.

If tracked aggressively, the dropping striker can set from a higher position into supporting midfielders, enabling the latter to receive facing forwards. They can then play quickly into the space between opposition defenders, with the right weight and detail of pass.

In the example above, the opposition midfielders have stayed central and restricted the pass into Füllkrug by front-screening him. Brandt then drifted wider into the half-space, where he could receive on the half-turn, facing forwards. This enabled Dortmund to play into him, before playing back inside the opposition’s shape.

Terzic has used other tactical adjustments to create central overloads, such as a temporary 3-4–3 structure. In the example below, Wolf at right-back has narrowed into a wide centre-back position, with left-back Julian Ryerson advancing into a higher and wider role. Jadon Sancho, meanwhile, has rolled inside to create a box structure.

This enabled Dortmund to better circulate possession. A back-three shape provides better lateral angles either side for retention, while also creating more diagonal-pass options for the wide centre-backs, to play inside the opponents’ shape into the central overload. This back-three structure can also be created by the pivot dropping between or outside the centre-backs, which is also commonly seen during Dortmund’s middle-third possession.

Congesting centrally in an attempt to overload also means that Dortmund’s wide players have more space, as the opposition are drawn centrally to restrict penetration. This can play into Dortmund’s strengths, given Donyel Malen, Jadon Sancho and Karim Adeyemi’s abilities to travel into space and attack 1v1.

Chance creation

Against opponents with higher defensive lines, Terzic has utilised intelligent play at both ends of his team to create opportunities in behind. A combination of Brandt’s creative ability, Adeyemi and Sancho’s out-in runs, and accurate deeper passing from Mats Hummels, Süle and Nico Schlotterbeck,  has proved a dangerous combination. Indeed, in the 2023/34 season, Süle had the Bundesliga’s seventh-highest long-pass accuracy (94.26 per cent), while Schlotterbeck had played the third-most passes into the final third (345).

Dortmund’s striker (Youssoufa Moukoko in the example below) will often drop to draw defenders out. In doing so, they create opportunities to run in behind from the half-spaces, or for wider out-in runs between or on the blind side of defenders. If the striker’s initial movement is untracked, Dortmund have a central overload. If tracked – or, as below, if the defender’s attention is fixed by the ball-player and/or movement ahead to drop in – it creates space for third-player runs in behind (as seen from Marcel Sabitzer, below, which led to a chance and goal for Dortmund).

In the final third, Terzic has relied a lot on individual flair from his wide players to combine or dribble inside the box to create chances. Dortmund had the second-most dribbles and 1v1s in the 2022/23 and 2023/24 Bundesliga seasons, indicating their reliance on individual quality to unlock opposition defences. This has come from Sancho, Adeyemi and Jamie Bynoe-Gittens, as well as advancing full-backs such as Ian Maatsen. To progress inside the box, the latter will often use pass and follows (below), one-twos with eights in the half-spaces, or the central striker pinning defenders.

Out of possession

Dortmund’s press dropped in intensity from a PPDA of 9.42 in the 2022/23 Bundesliga, to 11.2 in 2023/24. This indicated a shift into a more structured and passive approach, which is not to say Dortmund were unable to press effectively. Rather, Terzic chooses carefully the matches in which to do so.

When being more pragmatic out of possession, Terzic favours a 4-2-3-1 to stay compact, with a deeper line of engagement. The aim is to make play predictable, giving an opportunity to defend and regain in wider areas. The central striker will try to force possession to one side, using a curved pressing run to restrict play to the opposite side. The units behind can then shift across and retain balance to defend space between them.

As possession goes wider, the ball-side winger (Adeyemi, below) will hold a position inside, until the trigger of a pass into the opposition full-back/wing-back. The winger will then press in-out to lock the ball against the touchline, regaining if they can. Otherwise, they restrict play to a pass into pressure down the side, or a straight pass in behind to be easily defended. The attacking midfielder (Brandt, below) can take up an aggressive front-screening position on the opposition pivot. They are then in a dangerous position to counter-attack should they regain. The opposite winger (Sancho, below) narrows inside, primarily to stop a switch of play, or jump inside passes if there are any triggers to regain.

Terzic has sometimes altered this strategy to be more aggressive, particularly against teams building with a double pivot or with shallower full-backs. In this situation, Dortmund have shaped as more of a 4-3-3, to prevent the double pivot receiving unopposed, and to regain centrally.

The striker (Füllkrug, below) can jump the goalkeeper and force one way, while the ball-side winger (Adeyemi) alters his pressing run, to press out-in. This keeps the opposition full-back in his shadow. The aim is to restrict play into this deeper full-back, keeping Dortmund’s full-back (Wolf) in a more secure, deeper position. If the opposition full-back receives, Dortmund’s full-back would be required to jump out to press, which can leave larger spaces for centre-backs to defend. For example, this could leave the veteran Hummels vulnerable against athletic and pacy forwards. Additionally, if the opposition play inside into their deep double pivot, it can be an opportunity for advanced Dortmund players to time their individual pressing and intercept in a dangerous counter-attacking position.

Having started at Dortmund in a part-analyst role, it is perhaps no surprise that Terzic should have proved himself an adept tactician. In his playing days he reached no higher than the German fourth tier, but his subsequent coaching career has already scaled far greater heights. The promise is of much more to come.

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