Southampton 1 Leeds 0: tactical analysis

Southampton secured an immediate return to the Premier League at Leeds United’s expense, in this closely fought playoff final. Leeds had been relegated alongside Southampton last season, but despite finishing above their Wembley opponents in the Championship table, succumbed to a third defeat against the same opposition this campaign.

Russell Martin’s team took the lead thanks to Adam Armstrong’s 24th goal of the season. They subsequently played with discipline to restrict Leeds, who hit the bar late on with a Dan James header, while Alex McCarthy was reliable in the Southampton goal when called upon.

How the managers saw it

“We missed a few opportunities to make Leeds run a bit more and spend a bit longer in their half and there was a bit of tension in the game,” said Martin. “We scored a really, really nice goal – it’s something the guys work on a lot in terms of the way it built up. I didn’t want us to defend as long as we did in the last 25 minutes, but I thought when we had to defend, we defended so well and Alex [McCarthy] when we needed him was brilliant.”

“I want to say congratulations to Southampton,” said Daniel Farke. “They defended really well and were pretty effective. They had the one chance in the first half and were able to be clinical in this moment. We know the only thing that matters in such a final are the goals. We had more possession, more chances, more expected goals. They were a bit more clinical than we were.”

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed the key tactical points from this playoff final…

Leeds’ fast start

Leeds started the game quickly. They pressed aggressively in a 4-4-2 shape at goal-kicks, to restrict Southampton’s early opportunities to build and force them longer. This gave Leeds plenty of chances to regain possession. Georginio Rutter jumped from his attacking-midfield position for Leeds to create a front two with Joël Piroe. The pair arced their press to force Southampton to one side, restricting passes into central areas.

As Leeds dictated play (to Southampton’s right, in the example below), Crysencio Summerville positioned aggressively to press and regain any pass into Southampton’s full-back. This was occasionally an acting full-back, with Kyle Walker-Peters and Will Smallbone at times rotating in an attempt to disrupt the structure of the Leeds press. The remainder of Leeds’ midfield, meanwhile, shifted across. Glen Kamara occupied the ball-side midfielder, with Ilia Gruev and Willy Gnonto positioned to jump on to Southampton’s pivot – the trigger here was a longer pass back inside into congested central areas.

This led to a number of early, sustained attacks and momentum for Leeds. They utilised Archie Gray in particular in a more advanced position, enabling Gnonto to narrow and provide opportunities to play into, and combine in, the half-spaces. When Leeds worked possession around Southampton’s industrious front two – and Joe Rodon or Ethan Ampadu stepped in to break the first line – they looked to lure Flynn Downes out of a compact midfield structure. A quick bounce-combination with Gruev in the first half (below) stretched the space between Downes and Joe Aribo, playing into Gnonto positioned in the half-space. This allowed Gnonto to use his low centre of gravity to turn and combine quickly, playing a one-two with Rutter to create an opportunity he pulled narrowly wide.

Southampton’s disruptive shape

Once Southampton had weathered the early pressure, they gained a foothold in the game and looked dangerous. Shaping as a back three in possession, they caused significant issues for Leeds’ double pivot and central defenders through Aribo’s positioning and Adam Armstrong’s movement. Jack Stephens narrowed to create more of a back-three structure, alongside Jan Bednarek and Taylor Harwood-Bellis, while Walker-Peters, David Brooks and Ryan Fraser provided width on each side.

Smallbone and Aribo positioned wide in the half-spaces on the outside shoulder, to stretch the distance between Leeds’ double pivot of Kamara and Gruev. With Armstrong dropping into the space between them, this created a temporary overload. Gruev often opted to stay narrow to affect Armstrong early in the game, which allowed Southampton to switch into Aribo in space. Leeds’ full-backs were pinned back by Brooks and Fraser, while Rodon couldn’t step out to engage because the distance to press was too big and would have left big spaces between the back line.

In moments where Leeds were aggressive and Ampadu engaged Armstrong’s dropping-in, it created huge spaces in behind their high defensive line for runs beyond (below). This meant that, at times, Southampton had opportunities to exploit equal numbers on the last line.

Similar themes were evident for Southampton’s goal. Once Smallbone had received in the half-space (below), Ampadu stepped out to apply pressure. This left the Leeds back line disjointed, with Armstrong able to exploit the space in behind and finish calmly, as Rodon and Gray played him onside.

Rodon’s attention in the build-up to Smallbone’s pass was drawn to Aribo’s high positioning, which left him much wider than necessary and unable to cover and get across to Armstrong. This moment highlighted Southampton’s tactical approach in stressing and challenging Leeds’ defensive structure.

Southampton’s compact blocks

Southampton executed a disciplined out-of-possession game plan that restricted Leeds’ creation of notable chances. This was particularly important considering that Southampton sacrificed possession for large spells – their 40 per cent possession being one of their lowest possession totals of the season.

When in a mid-block, Southampton shaped as a 5-3-2, with Armstrong and Brooks looking to offset play to Leeds’ right in the early stages, in order to restrict supply to Summerville on the left side. Aribo was able to step out and press in-to-out, on to Gray and Rodon when necessary, to keep pressure on the ball-player. When play progressed wider, Brooks – as the opposite striker – looked to restrict the switch into the opposite full-back. Smallbone – as the opposite central midfielder – was able to release and apply pressure if necessary upon a switch of possession. Fraser dropped into the back five from his more advanced in-possession position, to maintain compactness and make it very difficult for Leeds to penetrate through (below).

In deeper areas and when defending in a low block, Southampton tweaked this approach and became a 5-4-1 (below). Samuel Edozie – on for the injured Brooks – dropped to the side of a midfield four, from his front-two position. This maintained compactness and restricted the potential supply into Summerville, who Southampton were intent on restricting from the outset. Armstrong also back-pressed in these situations, to retain small distances between units and give him a chance to intercept, should Leeds be loose in possession. 

Despite restricting Leeds, there were still a few nervy moments for Southampton as the game played out. Nonetheless, they remained resolute, including through 12 minutes of added time at the end of the final. Russell Martin and his team will now have to draw on similar levels of organisation and determination when they return to the Premier League.

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