Danny Röhl: tactics and style of play

When Danny Röhl was appointed manager of Sheffield Wednesday in October 2023, at the age of 34, he became the youngest manager in the EFL. It was also his first managerial role, and the club he was taking over were rock bottom of the Championship – seven points adrift, with only three draws from their first 11 games. A tough start, by anyone’s estimation.

By the end of that 46-game campaign Wednesday had stayed up, as Röhl turned an average of 0.27 points per game into 1.42 points. The following campaign he guided the Owls to a comfortable mid-table finish, before departing the financially troubled club in the summer of 2025 by mutual consent.

His achievements with Wednesday were enough to see him linked with the Glasgow Rangers job in October 2025. It is fair to say that Röhl is no stranger to clubs expected to challenge for silverware, having been an assistant coach with Bayern Munich and RB Leipzig in his native Germany, as well as the national team. In England, he also worked as assistant to Ralph Hasenhüttl at Southampton.

It has so far been an intriguing career path for the highly rated young German coach; it will be fascinating to see where he goes next, and what he achieves. Below, our UEFA licensed coaches have analysed Röhl’s tactics from his spell at Hillsborough…

Advancing the wide defenders

Danny Röhl utilised a variety of formations at Sheffield Wednesday, often flipping between back-four and back-five structures from game to game. When his side built from a back four, he had the two central defenders split quite wide, working either side of the goalkeeper. The full-backs moved higher much earlier – a key feature of Röhl’s side.

A double pivot ahead was often another key feature, despite Röhl utilising various shapes that included 4-2-3-1, 3-2-4-1, 4-4-2 and 5-4-1. One of the pivots would drop to help bounce the ball around the corner, often finding the spare, wide centre-back. From there, the receiving defender could step forward with the ball and connect with the high full-back or narrowing central attackers ahead.

When the opposition had an extra player in the front line, one of Röhl’s pivots would widen to help connect (as with Barry Bannan, below). This helped to draw the opposing winger forward, freeing a Wednesday full-back. With attackers also dropping to help link play, his side used this rotation well to get the full-back higher.

With a back three, Röhl’s side also built with two splitting centre-backs where possible. One of the three would venture forward off the ball into a full-back space and position themselves quite high. The wing-back on this side would then move even higher on to the opposition’s last line, or roll inside to support central combinations. The wing-back on the other side provided width, taking up as high a position as possible.

Röhl employed increasingly fluid rotations at Wednesday over the course of his time in charge, often from the initial back-three structure. In his second season they increased their average ball possession, penetrative passes, through balls and overall passing play towards the final third and opposition box. Occasionally (such as below) the advancing centre-back moved into a narrower position ahead of the build, joining the double pivot and allowing the wide attacker to hold the width instead. Wednesday’s rotations helped drag and disrupt wide markers, with the wing-back on the far side joining from deep but also working inside the wide attacker when required. This strategy helped keep Wednesday’s dangerous wingers wide, while building with just two central defenders in their first line.

Central combinations to release wide

In the attacking phase, Röhl’s side often utilised central combinations with teammates who were closely connected. The front line and advancing midfielders combined with incisive, short-passing combinations to break through the opposing central defence (below). With the double pivot positioned in close connection to these narrowed attackers, Röhl’s side created lots of penetrative attacks. The passing of Bannan was particularly influential in their attacking play.

From this position, Wednesday were also well positioned to counter-press and force mistakes on transition. Narrowed, central numbers have often been seen with Red Bull sides, something Röhl experienced with RB Leipzig. He also worked alongside Hasenhüttl, who shares similar ideas on narrowed attacking. This appears to have influenced some of Röhl’s attacking strategies.

At Wednesday, Röhl also had full-backs flying forward to overlap. With the attacking unit often so narrow, there was space in wide areas whether Wednesday counter-pressed and regained, built through the thirds, or attacked off direct, long balls. His full-backs – including Marvin Johnson, Pol Valentín and Yan Valery – moved high and early in build-up, giving them less distance to cover to overlap (below).

When using a back three, wide rotations also helped get the wing-backs moving forward to attack. In addition, one of the wide centre-backs would also join the attack, allowing wider teammates to move inside and add a player to any narrow combinations. When this wide centre-back advanced forward from the build-up, they often ended up overlapping and crossing. This is an idea used by Chris Wilder at Sheffield United, as well as being something César Azpilicueta did as a centre-back in a back three at Chelsea.

When the advancing centre-back stayed narrow to support the midfield, wide attackers provided crosses instead. Josh Windass, from the right, was particularly strong in this regard. After securing survival in his first year, Röhl’s side really showcased his style in his second season, delivering the fourth most crosses in the league, compared to the 11th fewest the season before. Wednesday’s improved attacking play also saw them work the eighth most shots in Röhl’s second season, compared to fifth fewest the year before.

Key coaching points for overlapping full-backs

• For a full-back to overlap, the wide player ahead must receive narrow or carry the ball inside to create space for the overlap.

• The full-back must manage their speed and time their run forward so they are not too high, too early, or too late.

• They should communicate while running forward when exactly to release the ball into their path.

• The ball must be played with the appropriate weight and angle of pass into the full-back’s running path.

• The full-back should quickly glance at the penalty area to see where the attackers or defenders are positioned.

• When crossing, an appropriate delivery must be chosen for the players attacking the box  – for example, whipped, cut-back, stood up or driven.

Röhl’s team defending with a back four

With a back-four structure Röhl used a few shapes and made some subtle tweaks as to how his team defended as a block. Mostly they used mid- or high blocks, without always fully committing to pressing high up the pitch – contrary to the Red Bull methodology. His back four was protected by another unit of four ahead, with the numbers nine and 10 working as a pair to cover the centre. This worked to force the ball wide as often as possible (below).

The 4-4-2 has then been used to cover access into the opposition’s deepest pivot, before working across the pitch as the wingers may then jump out to press any resulting wide play. Wednesday also used more of a defined 4-4-1-1 under Röhl. This was usually when the opponent had a very strong player at the base of the midfield, and Röhl wanted to limit their influence. That block also adapted into a 4-1-4-1 when Wednesday needed better protection between the lines. The number 10 worked back and the nine was more isolated in the first line, but with a stronger presence ahead of the two centre-backs. The 4-2-3-1 was used when going player-for-player against the opposition’s midfield three, leaving the nine to lock play one way when applying the first pressure. The the winger on the ball side then jumped forward, and the full-back supported when needed.

Defending with a back five

With a back five, there was an extra presence in the back line. Röhl’s block became slightly more withdrawn, and was deeper for longer. The wing-backs aggressively jumped out to press, often supported by the wide midfielder, especially when the structure resembled a flat and compact 4-5-1. The back line swung around and across the pitch with wide pressing, almost becoming a temporary back four. The double pivot then held and covered the middle for any attempted play forced or subtly reversed back inside.

The roles of the two wide midfielders varied – sometimes they were more aggressive to narrow, but also jumped higher to support the number nine (below). In those moments, the block became a 5-2-3 and could trigger a press to allow Röhl’s side to squeeze up the pitch as they aggressively pressed any backwards passes. The wing-backs were then forced to cover more ground as they pressed out of the back line, with the wide midfielders much narrower and pressing higher themselves in a front three.

The central midfielders were then responsible for filling any gaps in the back line, especially when the wide centre-back moved over to cover or apply their own pressure. Having two deeper midfielders helped cover quickly and efficiently, with one able to protect and screen any central passes. Occasionally one of the central midfielders jumped out to press with the nine, forming a 5-3-2 block. The wide midfielders/wing-backs tracked back more, especially when the opposition had a dangerous winger and full-back pairing. The three centre-backs could then stay narrow. If needed, one could jump into midfield to cover the space left by the pressing central midfielder, but also deal with any dropping central attacker who was looking to receive in the space vacated by Wednesday’s central jump.

The result was that a Wednesday team that had looked doomed to relegation when Röhl took over, stayed comfortably in the Championship. All under trying financial circumstances that eventually played a role in his departure. He certainly earned the right to another job of a similar, if not higher stature, to further prove his coaching and managerial credentials.

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