
Frank Lampard faced a considerable challenge when he was appointed Coventry City head coach in November 2024. Not only was he taking over a team teetering on the edge of the Championship relegation places, but he was also succeeding a club hero. Mark Robins had been Coventry manager for seven years, achieving no little success in that time. Lampard, meanwhile, arrived off the back of some chastening experiences in charge of Chelsea and Everton. A year on, however, and he has turned the Sky Blues into a top-of-the-table outfit.
Indeed, Lampard came close to guiding Coventry into the Premier League within six months of taking over. Unfortunately for him and his team, Sunderland scored a goal in added time of second-leg extra-time to decide their playoff semi final in May 2025. It was the second time Lampard had experienced Championship playoff heartbreak, having lost the final to Aston Villa when in charge of Derby County in 2019. But after 17 games of the 2025/26 season, he had Coventry 10 points clear at the top of the table.
Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed his tactical approach with the Sky Blues to date…
From a four to a three
Lampard has mostly utilised a 4-2-3-1 structure at Coventry, bar a brief period using a back three midway through his first season. That said, it has been common to see his team convert into a back three from a four when building play. If they do build initially with a four, his centre-backs split very wide of the goalkeeper, stretching the opposition’s first line of pressure. When needed, the goalkeeper steps forward and joins in between the two wide centre-backs.
Coventry haven’t necessarily dominated the ball with lots of short passing during Lampard’s tenure, averaging 52 per cent possession at time of writing. Instead, they look to play forward efficiently, building with short passes or switches of play, but with longer passes into the front line when available.
When forming a back three to build, one of the pivots sometimes drops between the two centre-backs – especially when that pair have remained wide in the first phase of the build and are carrying the ball forward. It has also been common to see one of the double pivot drop to the side of the back line, leaving the traditional central-midfield spaces (as with Matt Grimes, below).

Grimes has a good range of forward passing and helps support the build by dropping wide. Coventry can then keep one of their centre-backs in the middle of the pitch, in case they lose possession and need to defend a counter. In possession, right-back Milan van Ewijk will look to push forward, creating space in which the centre-backs can reposition across. Jay Dasilva has done the same on the left, but not as high. A nine and 10 pair is then maintained ahead, often with a winger moving inside if the original 10 has moved away in response to Grimes’ dropping.
Dasilva has also stayed in the back line at times, keeping the central midfield intact during the initial stages of Coventry’s build. Instead of dropping deeper, one of the pivots then has the option to move wider to become the link between the back line and the forwards (below). Again, Grimes’ repositioning helps with this, with Van Ewijk moving higher to provide wide support underneath winger Tatsuhiro Sakamoto. The nine and 10 pairing is again maintained, giving Lampard’s side numbers high up the pitch, ready to attack. Those in central midfield offer dropping runs to help connect the two units.

Key coaching points for shifting from a four to a three at the back in the build phase
• The player on the ball needs time, space and minimal pressure to allow others to reposition. Or players can rotate when the ball is dead.
• Those closest to the ball must support to make safe and secure passes that allow others to reposition.
• Early positioning and angles is needed from those rotating.
• Communication is imperative between those on and around the ball, to ensure movements are fluid and well timed.
• Option 1 for shifting from a four to a three: A midfielder drops between or alongside the two centre-backs, and both full-backs advance higher together. Toni Kroos was the master of this drop at Real Madrid.
• Option 2: Only one full-back moves forward, leaving the rest of the back line to shift across towards that side of the pitch. This was a feature of Arsenal when Oleksandr Zinchenko advanced into midfield from left-back.
• Option 3: A centre-back moves into midfield, leaving the other centre-back and the two full-backs to narrow together. John Stones played this role to great effect in Manchester City’s 2022/23 treble-winning season.
Numbers in the front line
In the attacking phase – and with Van Ewijk often moving very high from right-back – Coventry’s combinations on the right have been purposeful. With the number 10, or those rotating into that space, also supporting by moving across, Coventry have worked the ball forward efficiently. They have then utilised the numbers on this side to create chances and score goals. Should the 10 move over to the right, midfield runs from deep (Victor Torp, below) can support any attacks from the left. On this side, Coventry have tended to use more isolated individual runs and dribbles, with numbers joining from delayed forward runs.

Left-back Dasilva has supported with his crossing, making runs from deeper compared to Van Ewijk, not least due to the former’s involvement with the back-line conversion to a three. Van Ewijk also tends to be keener on getting forward in transitional moments and counter-attacks. Coventry had the most crosses in the 2024/25 Championship, with Van Ewijk ranking seventh for crosses in the entire division. After 17 games of the 2025/26 season, Lampard’s side led the way again with total crosses. Van Ewijk was once more their most prolific crosser.
As well as wide play, Coventry have also created chances by going direct. The front three and number 10 often attack in close proximity to each other, being particularly dangerous on attacking transitions (below). Van Ewijk typically provides immediate forward runs in these moments, but they are not always needed thanks to Haji Wright, Ephron Mason-Clark, Brandon Thomas-Asante and Sakamoto being so penetrative with their combinations, movement and regular attempts on goal.

The front line won’t overplay, either. Instead, they look to drive and carry the ball, working attempts as efficiently as possible. The number 10 – Jack Rudoni, Josh Eccles or Thomas-Asante (when used central) – have supported by providing runs forward that ensure opposing centre-backs are always having to defend. Drawing a centre-back out of line, or forcing them to man-mark for lengthy periods, has helped Coventry to ruthlessly exploit defences in the early stages of the 2025/26 campaign.
Lampard’s side – the front line in particular – have exhibited fantastic decision-making and a knack for getting in goalscoring positions. They had the fifth most shots in 2024/25 and top the rankings after 17 games in 2025/26. They have also shown an ability to pick each other out with key passes, deft balls in behind and well-timed passes to forward-running teammates. At time of writing they had played the most passes within 20 metres of the opposition goal, with all of the front line able to combine and create for one another, as well as finish.
4-4-2 defending
When Coventry defend for sustained periods without the ball, Lampard’s 10 has pushed up from the 4-2-3-1, forming a front-line pair alongside the centre-forward. Along with higher pressing, the first line tries to narrow and limit access into the opposition pivot. If there is one deeper midfielder, they cover access zonally, alternating which one jumps outwards to the centre-backs. If the opponent has a particularly strong pivot, they focus on more player-oriented marking, with the nine locking play one way. Coventry then resemble more of a 4-4-1-1.
When committed to a high press, they show and force the ball away from the centre. One of the first line jumps to the opposition centre-backs, while also trying to cut off a potential pass back into central midfield. The timing is crucial here. To support, the closest of Coventry’s central midfielders positions themselves in case the first line is broken (below).

To support the press out wide, Lampard’s closest central midfielder will help cover any dropping attacker – such as when the opposing winger shows short to the ball and the full-back runs forward the other way. Here, Coventry commit to a player-oriented approach, with their own winger tracking the opposing full-back. This allows Lampard’s full-back to be aggressive in stopping the receiving winger from turning. The central midfielder moves across to double up, creating a great opportunity to regain within the inside channel. Getting Van Ewijk to provide this pressing support on the right has helped Coventry to create attacks and crosses on transition.
In a more reserved defensive block, Coventry maintain the 4-4-2, again trying to show the ball wide and lock along the touchline. The full-backs maintain their aggressive approach, especially if the opposing winger is receiving on or near the touchline, or drops to receive to feet. Here, Coventry’s wingers work back to stop first-time passes inside and around the corner. Although this stops doubling up on the ball, it allows Lampard’s side to remain compact in spaces inside and immediately ahead of the ball (below).

The adjustments and details of Lampard’s central midfielders are also key when defending from within the 4-4-2 block. Rather than jumping higher to support the press, the closest midfielder to the ball drops on the angle, supporting the winger who has recovered inside. This helps cover any play through the inside channel. The central midfielder furthest from the ball will also cover across to maintain compactness. However, they also stay slightly higher, ready to cut off any loose or misplaced square passes. At times the front line could better support this wide trap from the block by screening access into the opposing pivot(s), but their placement does allow them to exploit any midfield regains.
It all adds up to an impressive first 12 months in charge of Coventry for Lampard. In that time he has demonstrated a tactical acumen that has put his team into a promising position in the notoriously competitive Championship. Becoming the first manager to lead Coventry back to the Premier League since their relegation in 2001 would be a big feather in his coaching cap.
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