Andoni Iraola tactics watch

Andoni Iraola arrived in the Premier League with the stamp of coaching success in Spain. He not only won promotion to La Liga with Rayo Vallecano in 2021, but also implemented an attractive, effective style of play in Spain’s top division. For a club used to fighting for La Liga survival, he even had Vallecano fighting for a European place.

Suitably impressed, Bournemouth confirmed Iraola as their new manager in June 2023. He joined Pep Guardiola, Mikel Arteta, Unai Emery and, at that time, Julen Lopetegui, as Spanish managers in England’s top flight. All of them – with the exception of Guardiola – were born in the Basque Country.

It was for Athletic Bilbao that Iraola, a right-back in his playing days, made 510 appearances between 2003 and 2015. His first head coach job was at Cypriot club AEK Larnaca in 2018; his first experience of the sack followed halfway through the season.

In 2019, he took over Spanish second division side Mirandés, leading them to the Copa del Rey semi finals for only the second time in their history. Then Vallecano came calling, and there Iraola carved a reputation as one of Spain’s most promising coaches. In three seasons, on a limited budget, he won the Segunda División playoffs and reached another Copa del Rey semi final. He also beat the might of Barcelona three times, and Real Madrid once.

Here, The Coaches' Voice highlights five main features of Iraola's tactics, from his time in charge of Rayo Vallecano…

Using the flanks

A feature of Iraola's in-possession approach is attacking via the flanks and utilising width. His full-backs frequently make overlapping runs as the wingers move inside. At Vallecano, winger Isi Palazón would make inside runs on the right, allowing the right-back to hit the byline and create chances.

This attacking intent from the full-backs also had the effect of stretching and creating spaces in the opposition back line. In Iraola's last two seasons at Vallecano, full-backs Fran García (who was signed by Real Madrid in June 2023) and Iván Balliu carried out these duties. Tireless in their running, they typically acted more as wing-backs than full-backs.

To allow the full-backs freedom to attack, Iraola's central midfielders were key. At Vallecano, this usually meant Santiago Comesaña and Óscar Valentín dropping into the defensive line when the team lost the ball and a full-back was out of position. The Spanish coach also asked that when one full-back attacked, the other held their position.

The majority of Vallecano’s attacks developed down the left flank, where Fran García and Álvaro García operated. Despite the latter being a natural winger and used to occupying the outside spaces, he complimented Fran García very well when the full-back joined the attack (below).

Midfield dominance

Iraola wants his team to control the midfield. In possession, Rayo Vallecano's 4-2-3-1 involved a fourth midfielder coming in from the wing – usually the right flank – to free that side and create passing lines. Palazón – a left-footed, inverted winger – excelled at doing this. Starting on the right flank, he would move between the lines and then attack the spaces created (below).

The extra player in midfield helped Iraola’s team control the ball and gave the full-backs greater freedom to join the attack. And when Vallecano lost the ball on the inside, it meant they had players close to the opposing ball-carrier, allowing for easier recoveries of possession.

When Palazón moved inside, he had freedom to occupy spaces as he pleased. Behind, Comesaña and Valentín acted as the double pivot, with Óscar Trejo in front of them. With Palazón at the same height as Trejo, Vallecano effectively had two number 10s forming a box midfield with the double pivots.

The long option

Although Iraola likes to dominate possession and play out from the back, he is not a coach who forces his players to take risks in the build-up. If the opposition pressed very high and there was a possibility of losing the ball at the back, both goalkeeper Stole Dimitrievski and centre-back Alejandro Catena (who moved to Osasuna in June 2023) were free to play long and look for space behind the opposition full-backs.

This direct play was used a lot by Vallecano, especially when they faced teams that left a lot of space behind. Here, they made use of quick attackers, such as Álvaro García and Sergio Camello.

The quality of Catena's long passing allowed Vallecano to stretch opponents, making them turn and shuffle across as play was switched to the flanks (below). With Catena playing direct, this opened up several options. One of the most productive was winger Álvaro García pinning his full-back inside, leaving the channel free for Fran García's attacking runs on the left.

Playing direct

Iraola had a clear objective in possession: damage the opposition. Whether it was Catena looking to play long from the back, or passes inside for a player between the lines, Vallecano always tried to be direct. If the centre-backs played sideways under little pressure, it was with a secondary objective of trying to play vertically as soon as possible.

The same went for the midfield trying to connect with attackers Raúl de Tomás,  Radamel Falcao, or Camello. The midfield line did not overelaborate, typically looking for a direct route to the opposition goal (below).

To do this, the driving runs of winger Álvaro García and the strikers’ movements encouraged verticality. At the same time, Iraola demanded players get in the box, with up to six or seven players who could provide a finish, on the first ball or arriving from the second line.

When the opposition defended deep and with numbers late on, Vallecano did not hesitate to put the ball into the box. From any area of the opposing half, Iraola's team would look for a pass into space to attack deep.

Bournemouth's new manager likes to play attacking football that allows his teams to consistently get into the opposition box. That approach can leave them open to quick and effective counter-attacks, but it is a risk that he is willing to take.

Change of structure without the ball

Out of possession, Iraola set his team up in a 4-4-2 formation, with the lines very close together, trying not to drop the defensive block too low (below).

The objective is to limit space, so that the opposition can't play inside and dominate. In this change of system, the number 10 lined up with the striker, so that the first press came from two forwards against the two central defenders.

Iraola wanted his players to be aggressive in the opposition half and try to recover possession close to the opposition box. With this counter-press, his teams attempt to stay in the opposition half as long as possible, to prevent easy progress and recover the ball high.

While the first press came from the striker and number 10, its effectiveness at Vallecano came very much from the work of the wingers, Palazón and Álvaro García. When the ball moved to the opposing full-back, they would attempt to prevent progression on the outside. At the same time, the midfield would shuttle across to prevent the opposition filtering the ball inside.

This high press is a physically demanding feature of Iraola's teams, but Vallecano's players bought into it. When they managed to steal the ball, the reward for their hard work was evident in the opportunities it created.

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