Fabian Hürzeler tactics and style of play

He may be younger than some of the players he has managed, but at 31 Fabian Hürzeler has already demonstrated his capability as a head coach. In his first full season in charge of German club St Pauli, Hürzeler guided them to the Bundesliga for only their second top-flight campaign since 2002. To illustrate the scale of his achievement, while his team finished top of the league, their more-celebrated Hamburg neighbours, HSV, could only finish fourth. Indeed, his management persuaded Brighton & Hove Albion to appoint him as successor to Roberto De Zerbi.

Hürzeler was born in Texas in 1993, when his Swiss father was working in the United States. Back in his mother’s native Germany, he played in the lower leagues for the reserve teams of Bayern Munich and Hoffenheim, before joining amateur club FC Pipinsried as a player-coach in 2016.

While his playing career petered out in his early 20s, his coaching career quickly blossomed, as he took on the role of assistant coach with Germany’s Under-18 and Under-20 teams. In 2020, St Pauli recruited him as assistant to then head coach Timo Schultz – the man he would succeed in the role, initially on an interim basis, in December 2022. From one win in their last 13 league games with Schultz, St Pauli duly won their first 10 games with Hürzeler at the helm.

By April 2023, at the age of 30, he had completed his UEFA Pro Licence and been named St Pauli manager on a permanent basis. Promotion to the Bundesliga the following season was another milestone in his meteoric start to life as a head coach. Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed Hürzeler’s tactics and style of play at St Pauli.

Centre-back into midfield

During Hürzeler’s first full season with St Pauli, his side averaged 57.4 per cent possession, the second-highest figure in Germany’s second division (2. Bundesliga). Their deeper build-up often involved shifting from three centre-backs – in an initial 3-4-3 shape – to just two. The middle of the trio – Eric Smith – moved into a pivot role, off the ball. As Smith has spent the majority of his career as a defensive midfielder, Hürzeler’s conversion of the Swede still gave his side a solid passing base, once he was in midfield, to progress up the pitch (below). Whenever Smith was unavailable, Hürzeler persisted with this tactical idea, moving Hauke Wahl into midfield, instead.

The wing-backs then held the width, as St Pauli would often build with an adapted back line of four. While it has been a trend for teams to build with a three – converted from an initial four – Hürzeler has chosen to do the opposite.

Hürzeler’s goalkeeper, Nikola Vasilj, proved a welcome part of their deeper build-up, making the fifth-most passes for St Pauli in 2023/24. With Smith in central midfield and often deeper than those around him, a diamond shape had Vasilj at the base, Smith as the point, with the two other centre-backs, Karol Mets and Wahl – St Pauli’s two most prolific passers that season – either side.

Here, Hürzeler’s team could overload central areas and combine through a press – or, when needed, simply build around into the advancing wing-backs. This was especially the case if opposition wingers had already jumped inside, meaning their full-backs had more ground to cover when directly defending against Hürzeler’s wing-backs.

The two central midfielders adapted their movements depending on the timing and, most importantly, the angle of Smith’s movement into midfield. One of the central midfielders would move away, creating space for Smith to advance into when moving out of the back line. This central midfielder would be careful not to disrupt the space taken up by the central forward, Johannes Eggestein, or that of top scorer Marcel Hartel. The latter was used as either a left-sided number 10 or the advancing central midfielder when Smith pushes up.

Creating chances

Hürzeler’s side made the second-most passes in the 2. Bundesliga in 2023/24, but played the second-fewest through balls. This meant they often had to break compact blocks where there was minimal space in behind. Another indication that opposing teams sat off and formed compact blocks was evidenced by St Pauli, across the season, having the highest PPDA against them. Furthermore, Hürzeler’s team played the fourth-most crosses in the division. Narrowed, opposing back lines were content to concede space out wide, while limiting St Pauli’s chances of penetrating through.

In total, 60 per cent of St Pauli’s crossing came from their right side. Right wing-back Manolis Saliakas and right winger Dapo Afolayan were a strong pairing as the team’s most prolific crossers. With Afolayan operating as a winger in the front three, his movements wide meant St Pauli initially lost a central presence in the front line. But with Smith moving into midfield from central defence, one of the central midfielders could then attack higher, replacing Afolayan. For the most part, this tended to be Hartel. It was no coincidence that he was the fourth-highest scorer in the 2. Bundesliga, with 17 goals, behind three players tied on 22.

Hartel joined the attack to support centre-forward Eggestein, as well as left-winger/left number 10 Elias Saad. Hürzeler’s left wing-back (Philipp Treu, below) provided width and balance, opposite the Afolayan-Saliakas pairing (below). As a result, St Pauli were particularly dangerous from crosses, cut-backs and wide combinations in general.

Centre-forward Eggestein proved a useful finisher in the box, with Hartel arriving late from deep to add his goalscoring touch. Jackson Irvine also contributed as a late-arriving central midfielder, often when Hartel was used in the left 10 role, where the latter was naturally much further forward. Both Saad and Afolayan attacked the back post with purpose, regardless of their differing roles in the build-up. With many of their attacks relying on late runs, St Pauli recorded the most shots in the division from outside the penalty area – a byproduct of delayed central runs, latching on to deliveries from wide areas.

Wide pressing trap

St Pauli were eighth in the 2. Bundesliga for the PPDA metric, indicating that they employed some high pressing when appropriate, but not as much as other teams. Instead, they favoured mid-blocks when defending. When Hürzeler’s side did jump to regain the ball high, they often forced play into wide areas and away from the centre. This was more the case on the right side, possibly with a view to winning the ball back to feed their attacking combinations on this side. It did also occur on the left, though, with the wingers playing a key role in the press.

Afolayan jumped forward to press the wide centre-back in a three, or the left-back in a four. Centre-forward Eggestein supported, locking play to this side, as St Pauli attempted to quarter the pitch by aggressively swarming the widest opposing defender. Right wing-back Saliakas would then support Afolayan’s jump, even if that meant leaving his initial opponent to engage a new one.

From here, the rest of the back line swung around, making sure that the opponent closest to the ball was aggressively tracked. The central midfielders jumped on to the opposition pivots. The winger on the far side – usually Saad on the left, as St Pauli jumped on their right – would narrow significantly. Meanwhile, Hürzeler’s strategy of swarming the widest opposing defender on the ball naturally meant leaving the far-side defender free (below).

Block

When defending, but not pressing, St Pauli converted into a back five – most commonly in a 5-4-1 structure. The advancing middle centre-back – Smith or Wahl – quickly recovered into the back line, with the wing-backs doing likewise to form a defensive unit of five. Wingers Saad and Afolayan dropped into the second line, working alongside the two central midfielders. That left single centre-forward Eggestein to screen access into the deepest opposing pivot (below).

Saad and Afolayan narrowed, once they had formed the second line. In doing so, they helped the two central midfielders protect the middle of the pitch, often when facing a central-midfield trio. This meant giving up space in the wide areas, but because Hürzeler deployed a back line of five, the closest wing-back to the ball had licence to aggressively jump out. The wing-back could then stop crosses at source, as well as passes inside towards a number 10, forcing the play around. There, if crosses were played into St Pauli’s area, the three central defenders were usually able to deal with them.

As the wing-backs jumped out, the closest central midfielder dropped and covered inside, offering further protection against any number 10. This could only happen because St Pauli’s wingers had narrowed in support. Once this midfield cover was in place, Hürzeler had his defensive trap in the wide areas – but this time just inside St Pauli’s half, as opposed to pressing high.

These tactics served St Pauli and Hürzeler fantastically well in the 2. Bundesliga. At the age of just 31, he had marked himself out as a head coach headed for even greater things. 

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