Ipswich Town 1 Manchester United 1: tactical analysis

Manchester United and Ipswich Town shared the points at Portman Road, kicking off the Ruben Amorim era for the visitors. United’s new manager – who arrives with a reputation as one of the most promising young head coaches in Europe – watched his team take the lead after only 81 seconds. It was a dream start that did not last, however, as the home side fought back to earn a deserved draw. 

Ipswich – themselves led by an impressive young manager, in former United coach Kieran McKenna – hit back before half-time through a deflected Omari Hutchinson strike. McKenna’s team could have scored more, with Liam Delap twice denied from close range by André Onana, but could not find a winner that would have taken them out of the relegation zone. United, meanwhile, will expect Amorim to lift them far higher than their current position of 12th. 

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have highlighted the key tactical points from this meeting between McKenna’s Ipswich and the arriving Amorim’s Manchester United…

How the managers saw it

“When the game got away from us a little bit in the second half, and we lost the domination that we'd had, we stuck together,” said McKenna. “[We] defended on shape, everyone stuck to their jobs, we didn’t give away many big chances, and that gave us a chance to still win the game. Conor [Chaplin] had a good chance from the cutback at the end that could have done that.”

“They [the United players] were thinking too much during the game, trying to cope with everything we said during training,” said Amorim. “But it was [just] two trainings. We could win this game, but also Onana did great saves.”

United’s right inside-channel

Ruben Amorim went with a 3-2-4-1 structure when United were in possession. Bruno Fernandes and Alejandro Garnacho played the number 10 roles, with Diogo Dalot and Amad Diallo as wing-backs. And it was United’s right inside channel that caused Ipswich early issues, as Fernandes dropped to receive. This manipulated Ipswich’s back line, with left-sided centre-back Cameron Burgess initially unsure whether to push forward on to Fernandes, as Garnacho moved in the opposite direction (below). Ipswich’s narrow front line and double pivot focused on United’s central-midfield pair, meaning early combinations between an unmarked Fernandes and wing-back Diallo helped United take an early lead. It was Diallo who suppled the cross for Rashford to score.

Although Ipswich’s press was more effective against United’s left side – largely due to Dalot not being as effective 1v1 as Diallo – there were still moments where Garnacho dropped to link with Dalot and Casemiro. Switches of play then helped United to keep accessing their right inside channel. With Axel Tuanzebe moving out of Ipswich’s back line to track Garnacho, the remaining back three held their position. Fernandes and Diallo could then combine, with Rashford ready to penetrate beyond (below).

Ipswich high-press solutions

McKenna and Ipswich responded to their issues with United’s right side by adapting their high press. Sammie Szmodics continued to jump on to United’s right-sided centre-back, Noussair Mazraoui, but switched to pressing outwards and screening potential passes into United’s closest pivot, Christian Eriksen. Jens Cajuste – the central midfielder on Szmodics’ side – could then readjust, taking care of Fernandes’ dropping movements (below). From here, the Ipswich back line could stay intact, with both centre-backs in more comfortable positions.

Ipswich’s high-press adaptations not only limited United’s attacking play, but also allowed the home side to have more of the ball in the opposition half. McKenna’s team also used a back-three system with the ball, as left-back Leif Davis advanced high and wide. Szmodics moved inside, but rotated with Delap between the lines. Hutchinson’s dropping movements in the right inside channel then helped draw United’s double pivot, and Ipswich flipped the momentum by exploiting the space ahead of the visitors’ three centre-backs. Delap nearly equalised, drawing a point-blank save from Onana. Two minutes later, Hutchinson’s 43rd-minute strike took a deflection off Mazraoui to deservedly level the game.

Amorim’s second-half changes

Amorim swapped the positioning of Fernandes and Garnacho for the second half, in which United had more than 70 per cent possession. But this particular change offered little in terms of chance creation, as United forced their forward passes – some of which were very direct – into isolated runners. As Rashford dropped to set back, opposite movements from Garnacho aimed to exploit space behind Rashford’s marker. From here, longer passes or switches to the far side initially helped United to play over and around Ipswich’s high press (below). However, with United having so many players deeper as part of their build, any attackers were isolated and mostly unable to create attempts on goal.

United then attempted to combine more through the centre. Manuel Ugarte replaced Casemiro after 56 minutes, followed by Joshua Zirkzee and Rasmus Højlund on for Eriksen and Rashford, respectively, after 68 minutes.  Fernandes started to drop when United were in possession, acting as an initial second pivot alongside Ugarte. Zirkzee also dropped to combine and connect, with Garnacho higher – as in the first period – and wing-backs Diallo and Dalot holding the width. With Højlund on, United played into their Danish forward, who held and secured possession, before combining with central runners. This meant United could play forward, although this was sometimes with uncontrolled, longer passes.

As the game reached its latter stages, it became much more transitional. This benefited Ipswich, who created the better chances, particularly from crosses. United, meanwhile, were unable to capitalise on their second-half possession, which is something Amorim will be working hard to rectify in the coming weeks and months.

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