Pep Guardiola is no stranger to making tactical modifications to already successful teams, but ahead of Manchester City's historic 2022/23 campaign he had to make one major change: that of incorporating the team’s major summer signing and new number nine, Erling Haaland.
Haaland’s form was spectacular from pretty much the moment he arrived in English football – 52 goals in all competitions in his first season gives evidence in abundance of that. The team as a whole, however, took a little more time to hit full stride. When they did, the results were more in line with what he have come to expect from City during the Guardiola era. Between defeat at Tottenham in early February and a by then meaningless loss at Brentford in late May, City won 20 and drew five in an unbeaten run that formed the foundations of their run to the treble.
But how did Guardiola develop his tactics across the season, and what were the key elements behind his team’s staggering success? Our experts have picked out five areas of interest, beginning with perhaps the most fascinating of all: the rise of John Stones the midfielder.
The new build
Traditionally, City’s build-up in the first third would feature the two centre-backs in a back four starting wide and the goalkeeper, Ederson, playing a central role. Ederson’s quality on the ball means he is still heavily involved, but the set-up in front of him has changed.
Previously, as well as the two available centre-backs, the goalkeeper would have the option of playing into the team’s single pivot – usually Rodri. Now, the first line of attack in front of Ederson is made up of three players: one centre-back, mostly Rubén Dias; and two outside him who are either centre-backs or full-backs – this has usually been two of Manuel Akanji, Nathan Aké and Kyle Walker.
The key difference has been the addition of a second central midfielder in the second line, in the form of John Stones. With Stones operating on the same line as Rodri, the opposition has been forced into committing more players in the central channel, which has created more space for players to receive or drive into, outside them (below).
The 3-2 structure in build-up was often replicated in the final third, where one of the number 10s – usually Ilkay Gündogan and Kevin De Bruyne – would advance in support of Haaland. That would leave an attacking line of three – the other number 10, plus the two wide attackers, often Jack Grealish and Bernardo Silva – behind them. Opponents would here face the decision of whether to mark zonally or go man-for-man. If they marked zonally, City were particularly accurate and aggressive when space opened up behind; if the opposition went man-for-man, there was space in between the lines for City’s intelligent number 10s to exploit.
All of the above also allowed City to play more directly – a weapon not common in Guardiola teams – to overcome opposition presses in their own half, and attack in the opposition half with significant numbers.
Possession versus progression
Despite the high technical level throughout the squad, City’s reliance on short build-up play had not always worked in their favour. Highly organised opposition presses worked to reduce both their space and time on the ball, which caused problems even for players of City’s quality. As a result, possession didn’t always lead to progression.
With Haaland in the team, however, Guardiola now had the realistic option of a direct ball into the front line. Opponents that had previously used an effective high press against City now had to think twice about doing so again, against a forward with the ability to protect and retain longer passes (below) and teammates looking to support in numbers.
The result of this, of course, is that many opponents took up a more conservative block, and City continued to play with possession at the heart of their build-up. The enduring quality of Ederson and those in front of him on the ball, together with numbers further forward, gave the team an increased ability to adapt to every kind of situation they faced.
Erling Haaland
It’s impossible to accurately analyse the development in Guardiola’s team without focusing specifically on the impact of their new number nine – but the manager has also developed his team to exploit Haaland’s potential to its full.
As already covered, if progress was difficult in the face of a good opposition press, Haaland was capable of receiving all kinds of direct ball with his back to goal. This allowed his teammates to get forward and exploit the space in behind created by defenders dragged out of position to track him.
The Norwegian attacked areas of the box where the ball could drop with constant off-the-ball runs (above), often finishing with his first touch or looking for an option that ended with a shot.
Haaland’s impact isn’t limited to the in-possession phase, of course. The team’s intense full-pitch press was only possible thanks to his ability to sustain such a high tempo from the front line (below) throughout games, but he also has the tactical intelligence to know where to direct his pressing and how to take advantage of his positioning after a regain. From there, his combination of pace, power and finishing often proved fatal to beleaguered opponents.
Set-piece variety
City have long been able to rely on high-quality set-piece delivery, with the likes of De Bruyne, Gündogan and Riyad Mahrez all expert at dead-ball situations. The addition of Haaland has given the team an added threat in not only attacking the first ball, but also seizing on second balls and rebounds, while the likes of Rúben Dias, Manuel Akanji, Nathan Aké and John Stones offer height and physicality in both boxes.
The result is that City can now rely on direct crosses and deliveries into the box much more than Guardiola teams traditionally would. On top of this, teams are now so concerned with City’s direct threat at set-pieces that it gives Guardiola’s team the opportunity to take advantage with more nuanced deliveries. Gündogan’s second goal in the FA Cup final victory over Manchester United, which turned out to be the match-winner, gave a great example of this. With United packing the box to deal with City’s physical threat, De Bruyne was able to clip a ball to a totally free Gündogan on the edge of the area (below).
Out of possession
In the 2022/23 season, City’s defensive organisation shifted to a more traditional 4-4-2 shape. From their adapted 3-2-4-1 in-possession formation, one of the double pivot dropped into the defensive line, while the other would push up into the midfield line; one of the number 10s would advance to press alongside the striker, creating the 4-4-2. The relatively narrow midfield line of four gave City a protective central overload that forced their opponents wide.
From here, City pressed their opponents with a closed funnel structure (below) that often forced them to play long, and into City’s increasingly powerful back line, or backwards, encouraging City’s effective high press.
Once they had won the ball, Guardiola’s team was as effective as ever on the counter-attack, with the two players in the front line well positioned to attack the box or get in behind the defensive line in transition.
To learn more about football tactics and gain insights from coaches at the top of the game, visit CV Academy
