Régis Le Bris tactics analysed

After being relegated from the Premier League in 2017, Sunderland experienced some tough times, including four seasons in the third tier. For a club with great potential, the manager’s role was proving a challenging affair. Four months into Régis Le Bris’ time in charge, however, hope had been restored that this proud club could return to England’s top flight. Going into the November international break of the 2024/25 campaign, Le Bris had guided Sunderland to the top of the Championship, with nine wins and four draws from their opening 15 fixtures.

Le Bris arrived at the Stadium of Light in the summer of 2024, having spent two years in charge of French club Lorient. That was his first head-coach role,  after he had worked for a decade in Lorient’s academy system, both as a coach and the head of youth development.

Born in northwestern France in 1975, as a young player he represented his country at youth level, before a lowkey career as a defender in the French and Belgian leagues. “As a player, I was interested in understanding the game, because I probably didn’t have the X factor technically or physically,” Le Bris has explained. His thirst for knowledge also extended to gaining a doctorate in sport physiology and biomechanics, before he embarked on his coaching career.

Below, our expert team of UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed Le Bris’ tactics and style of play…

Playing style and tactical flexibility

With his background in youth development, Le Bris has a track record of giving players a platform to improve within a structured approach, both in and out of possession. Most of his managerial success has come when deploying variations of a back four – either a 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1 – typically building with four in the back line. Even when using a 3-4-3 in his second season at Lorient, Le Bris had a wing-back who would often help replicate a traditional back-four structure.

While his teams have been versatile in their approach to building from the back, they have primarily passed to the pivot or higher-positioned eights. These midfielders having been encouraged to intelligently drift and time movements into vacated space. From there, they could turn or bounce possession, once their centre-backs have provoked the opposition’s first pressing-line into creating central spaces.

His  centre-backs have often widened their starting positions, to stretch the pressing distance for the opposition, while the full-backs have advanced to provide an outlet to clip into (below). Indeed, Le Bris’ teams have been willing to play longer passes into a stretched and manipulated last line, exploiting space higher up the pitch when they have faced an aggressive, player-oriented press.

In his relatively short time as a head coach, Le Bris has so far been tactically flexible. At Lorient, his team operated with a 3-4-3 (below) for the vast majority of the 2023/24 season. In this shape, they built with a 3-2 structure, with a back three and double pivot. They also had two attacking midfielders, in an attempt to overload the opposition, centrally, with wing-backs advanced to threaten the last line, along with a central striker.

This shape also enabled Lorient to drop into a more compact 5-4-1 when out of possession, although they did concede the most goals (66) in Ligue 1 in 2023/24. The use of this system coincided with Lorient’s relegation from Ligue 1, which perhaps explains why Le Bris switched to a back four at Sunderland.

Attacking threats and chance creation

Le Bris has developed exciting, attack-oriented teams with a focus on attacking in wide areas. He often tries to utilise wide triangles, via the relationship between full-backs, number eights and wide midfielders. This is demonstrated below, where full-back Trai Hume, number eight Chris Rigg and winger Patrick Roberts were positioned to combine, getting in-behind the opposition back line. Le Bris has given these players freedom and fluidity, often rotating to disrupt opposition structures, with Hume regularly overlapping and underlapping.

When progressing into the half-spaces to cross or play a cutback, Le Bris’ sides have attacked with significant numbers. The opposite wide-forward and full-back have often attacked the back post, as with left-back Dennis Cirkin in the example above. The central striker has looked to work off the blind side of the ball-side defender, making movements between centre-backs. Meanwhile, midfielders such as Jobe Bellingham have looked to time their arrival around the edge of the box to meet cutbacks first time.

Le Bris has tended to prioritise wide 1v1s, tasking technical, unpredictable wide players with beating their direct opponents, in order to cross or provide a cutback. In his most successful season at Lorient (2022/23) his team registered the third highest number of 1v1s and dribbles in Ligue 1. He has since repeated this theme at Sunderland, who had the highest number of 1v1s and dribbles in the 2024/25 Championship after 15 games. A feature has been the use of inverted wide-forwards, such as the right-footed Romain Mundle and left-footed Patrick Roberts (below). Operating on the opposite side to their preferred foot, these players can use their skill and agility to unbalance defenders, and drive inside the pitch on occasion to provide a direct goal-threat.

Out of possession

Without the ball, Le Bris’ teams are generally passive, with a preference to drop into a compact 4-4-2 (below). In both his full seasons as Lorient manager, they were the second most passive side in Ligue 1, with PPDAs of 14.68 and 15.21. In this structure, the front two can be patient and restrict central penetration by screening the opposition’s pivot(s), while shifting across the pitch. Once engaged, the ball-side striker will arc their pressing run to force possession wider, making play predictable. The other forward will drop in on a diagonal angle, to restrict a switch of possession while limiting the ability for the opposition to penetrate centrally.

The ball-side wide midfielder applies pressure when the opposition play the ball into their full-backs or wing-backs. The rest of the midfield-line shift across, with the opposite wide-midfielder narrowing to cover the opposition’s far-side central midfielder, to retain compactness.

However, Le Bris’ teams have adapted to be more aggressive from goal-kick restarts. They can easily transition from a 4-4-2 block into a 4-2-4, going player-oriented against an opposing back-four structure – as shown in the example below, against Hull City’s deep build.

Here, Rigg has jumped to press the opposition’s centre-backs, alongside Wilson Isidor. Both were ready to jump the opposition goalkeeper, while cutting off their respective centre-back, arcing their pressing run to keep the centre-back in their cover shadow. Roberts and Mundle have taken up higher starting positions, initially staying narrow to restrict central penetration. They could then aggressively press in-out on any passes into the full-backs; the intention being to regain possession either from a full-back, or force a longer pass into Sunderland’s back line. In a similar fashion, Le Bris’ Sunderland have also pressed player-for-player against opponents with a back three, adapting to both 3-5-2 and 3-4-3 structures.

Another example of Le Bris adapting his pressing structure at goal-kicks can be seen below. This came against Middlesbrough’s 4-2 build-up, where Hayden Hackney and Aidan Morris were operating as a deep double-pivot for the opposition. In this situation, with the ball set at the goalkeeper, Sunderland began as a 4-1-3-2. Rigg and Eliezer Mayenda were the front two, with Bellingham positioned between the double pivot. Mundle and Roberts narrowed to dissuade central passes, while also being able to travel to full-backs if necessary.

Following a pass into the centre-back (George Edmundson), the ball-side forward (Mayenda) arced his pressing run to force play wide. Mundle waited for the trigger of a pass into Luke Ayling, before he pressed aggressively. Bellingham shifted across, on to Morris as the ball-side pivot, while Rigg as the second striker dropped into a position to front-screen the opposite pivot, Hackney. On the far side, Roberts narrowed to maintain a connected position to react to any pressing triggers. From this structure, Sunderland were able to make the opposition’s play predictable, restricting passing options and get a platform to regain possession.

These are some of the tactics that have served Sunderland well during the early months of Le Bris’ time with the club. He may well need to demonstrate more tactical flexibility to keep the momentum going, but it has certainly been a promising start to his coaching career in England.  

To learn more about football tactics and gain insights from top-class professional coaches, visit CV Academy