When Oliver Glasner took over at Crystal Palace in February 2024, the club were 15th in the Premier League after 10 defeats in their previous 17 games. By the end of the campaign he had guided them to 10th, with a run of six wins and a draw from their final seven games. That sequence began with a well-deserved win against Liverpool at Anfield, and included a 4-0 thrashing of Manchester United and a 5-0 demolition of Aston Villa, both at Selhurst Park. It was an impressive end to what had looked like a season in which Palace could face a relegation battle.
All of which raised expectations about what Palace could achieve under the leadership of their Austrian head coach. Glasner had arrived in south London as a 2022 Europa League-winning manager, from his spell with Eintracht Frankfurt. He followed this by leading the Bundesliga side to the German Cup final 12 months later.
Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed the tactical approaches Glasner has taken in his head-coach roles in Germany, with first Wolfsburg and then Eintracht Frankfurt, as well as from his first few months in charge of Palace.
Versatile attacking play
Glasner’s teams rarely dominate possession. They have never averaged more than 51 per cent across a season. At Wolfsburg, he moved from his trademark 3-4-2-1 shape to a 4-2-3-1 formation midway through his first season. However, the attacking movements from the back four almost mirrored those of a back three. The back line tried to be efficient and penetrate with their passing, quickly looking to find teammates between the lines or hit the spaces in behind the opposition.
During this versatile readjustment, one of Glasner’s double pivots would push higher off the ball, to become a second number 10. Whenever a Wolfsburg winger received – or dropped short, dragging the opponent’s full-back with them – one of the two number 10s made runs to disrupt the opposing back line. When this dragged one of the opposition centre-backs out of shape, Wolfsburg’s powerful centre-forward Wout Weghorst could isolate the other centre-back and attack balls into the penalty area.
Alternatively, Wolfsburg’s wingers would reposition inside to act as a second number 10, allowing the full-backs to advance. If this only occurred on one side of the pitch, three of the four in the back line stayed underneath the ball to defend against any transition, along with the double pivots. This was important, because in every one of his four seasons as a Bundesliga head coach, Glasner’s sides ranked in the top five for ball losses. In the 2021/22 season, his Eintracht Frankfurt team ranked first.
This was possibly due to the urgency with which the back line attempted to play forward. There were also times – usually when behind – when both wingers narrowed around the 10. This gave the team three players between the lines, supporting underneath Weghorst. One of the pivots would drop out to form a temporary three in the back line, with both full-backs advancing (below).
Crossing threat
When any of these readjustments occurred from the 4-2-3-1 – especially in Glasner’s second season with Wolfsburg – the team offered a strong crossing presence. In the 2021/22 Bundesliga, Wolfsburg ranked fifth for crosses. This improved when he joined Frankfurt, who ranked third and fourth in the league for crosses in his two seasons there – albeit from a more permanent 3-4-2-1 shape.
In the 2020/21 campaign at Wolfsburg, Ridle Baku, Kevin Mbabu and Paulo Otávio were used as full-backs and provided the most crosses. Weghorst – who scored 36 Bundesliga goals in two seasons under Glasner – was the main target. This was especially the case when central spaces were too congested for the adapted number 10s.
At Frankfurt, Filip Kostic – used as a wing-back – provided the most crosses in the whole of the 2021/22 Bundesliga. Glasner’s wing-backs were again key deliverers in 2022/23; extra crosses came when the number 10s made outward movements (below), as opposed to the forward runs from deep or inward movements used at Wolfsburg.
These permanent 10s in the 3-4-2-1 were encouraged by Glasner to combine more with the advancing wing-backs, or cross themselves from narrowed positions. Mario Götze had a key role here, while still looking to combine with the rest of the front line. Glasner’s Frankfurt needed fewer rotations than his Wolfsburg side to reach his preferred attacking shape.
Into the Premier League
After taking over at Crystal Palace in February 2024, Glasner immediately converted Roy Hodgson’s 4-2-3-1 into the back three used at Wolfsburg and Frankfurt. The narrow trio of Jean-Philippe Mateta, Eberechi Eze and Michael Olise offered a significant central threat. They were able to combine and create in tight areas, while all three also provided goals. Eze and Olise could also drift and rotate outwards, with their experience of attacking as wide players. Runs through the inside channels and around the back of the wing-backs moving inside helped Palace to disrupt the spaces between opposing full-backs and centre-backs.
In the 2024/25 season, Glasner has again adapted his front line, due to personnel changes – mainly Eddie Nketiah in, with Olise joining Bayern Munich – that have slightly changed the dynamics of their attacking movements. Mateta and Nketiah typically both offer direct threats to opposition back lines, with Eze in more of a free role (below). The latter still threatens and combines centrally, but also drifts wider and, when needed, rotates with wing-backs Tyrick Mitchell and Daniel Muñoz.
Aggressive duelling
Another defining aspect of Glasner’s sides has been the aggressive nature of their individual duelling. In his four Bundesliga seasons, Glasner’s sides consistently ranked among the top six for total duels, including a first with Frankfurt in 2021/22. Other than his final year in Germany, Glasner’s teams were also regularly among the lowest for PPDA. This indicated their preference and ability to counter-press, and jump high up the pitch to impact the opposition’s build-up. But with a regularly high number of ball losses, plus a direct passing style from the back line, a large proportion of this duelling did come after conceding possession.
In the 4-2-3-1, back-pressing from the centre-forward helped force the ball into central traps. The double pivots then had licence to aggressively jump any straight passes – particularly those into opponents facing their own goal (below). Further support from the number 10 helped limit any passes back out of the central trap, with the wingers responsible for any opposing full-back advances. The far-side winger would narrow, but not too early that they allowed switches over their head. Instead, they would take up a half-and-half position, able to press wide but also support inside. The back line narrowed and squeezed space between the lines, looking to remain as a single unit for as long as possible and rarely jumping up out of line unless absolutely necessary.
Setting wide traps
With a back three, Glasner’s counter-pressing naturally had a stronger central presence due to the rotations in possession, plus the 3-4-2-1 shape having a box of four. Instead of the more frequent central traps set in the 4-2-3-1, this shape helped force the ball into wider pressing traps. The nine and 10s narrowed to funnel the ball outwards, with the wing-back closest to the ball ready to jump when needed.
One key strength of Glasner’s wider press was the 10s locking play towards the touchline particularly well. This meant the wing-back could stay in touch with the opposing winger, and track any forward run while also keeping the back line intact – something Glasner also looked for with a back four. From here, the wider centre-backs in the back three had total licence to follow any dropping movements (below). This allowed the double pivots to stay focused on their direct opponents, and further support the 10s in locking play wide. Centre-backs Evan Ndicka and Tuta were among the top 10 for most duels in the 2021/22 Bundesliga, likely thanks to Glasner giving them licence to aggressively track into midfield. Any backwards pass from the wider trap was then jumped by the centre-forward and the 10 nearest the ball, moving from counter-pressing and a high block to a fully committed high press.
Defending at Palace
Glasner has continued to use the 3-4-2-1 shape in his first year with Palace, where he has still demanded aggressive duelling. His team ranked second for duels after nine games of the 2024/25 Premier League season. However, Palace’s PPDA has been significantly higher than it was in his time in Germany, with the Eagles making more use of blocks. Glasner’s back line at Palace can quickly go from a back three to a five, with a flattened unit of four in front. The number 10s occupy the wider defensive roles in the secondary unit, with the central forward alone as the first point of defensive contact in a 5-4-1 block.
Palace still set wide traps, with their wider midfielders eager to jump out and press, albeit from a deeper and flatter starting position. The wing-backs deal with opposing wingers – as seen at Frankfurt – while the wide centre-backs still have licence to aggressively jump on to any attacker attempting to receive between the lines (below).
Performing this particular defensive strategy in a low block could lead to more severe consequences when compared to the higher press. Should the opposition exploit this gap when purposefully drawing out Palace’s wider centre-back, then there is little time for a recovering run from someone in the back line. When performed higher, not only can the back line readjust and protect the space, but there is still a long way for the attacker to go. Compared to Palace’s reserved blocks, one well-timed move could result in a good chance to score.
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