Arsenal tactics: Mikel Arteta analysis

When Mikel Arteta was appointed Arsenal head coach in December 2019, the club were 10th in the Premier League after 17 games. The Gunners – no longer regular Champions League qualifiers – were seven points adrift of the top four and had already conceded 27 goals. Fast-forward six years and the picture was very different. After 11 games of the 2025/26 campaign, Arteta had Arsenal top, four points clear after 11 games, with a measly five goals conceded and seven clean sheets to their name. After three consecutive runners-up finishes, the Spaniard again had his team in the thick of a title race.

This is an Arsenal side hungry for success. The FA Cup won at an empty Wembley in the pandemic-hit 2019/20 season is scant reward for their consistent progress in Arteta’s six years in charge. They could perhaps count themselves unfortunate to have come up against a Manchester City side on an unprecedented run of four consecutive league titles. Not to mention a Liverpool good enough to wrest the title from Pep Guardiola’s iron grip on two occasions. But with Liverpool struggling in the early part of the 2025/26 campaign, and City losing three games before November, a window of opportunity has opened for Arteta’s impressive Arsenal. And they have also made big strides in the Champions League, as seen in this demolition of Atlético Madrid…

Below, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed the 2025/26 version of Arteta’s title-chasing team.

Rice joining attacks

At time of writing in the 2025/26 season, Arteta had maintained his use of 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 structures. Indeed, Arsenal often flip between the two as they move from building the attack to finishing it. Within this, Declan Rice has frequently taken up a higher, more attacking position than previously, working more between opposing lines and providing box-to-box support. During deeper build-up he has still played his part in a double pivot, but will then look to get forward. Probably as a result, his passes into the final third (8.05) and the penalty area (2.2) per 90 minutes have increased so far this season (5.3 and 1.95 in the last campaign).

Arteta has managed to integrate Rice’s advances with the roles of his attacking players, including summer signing Eberechi Eze. After arriving from Crystal Palace, Eze has begun to have an impact as a central number 10 between the lines, having initially been introduced on the left.

With Rice largely deployed on the left of the double pivot alongside Martín Zubimendi, his forward runs naturally target the left inside channel. From here, Eze has licence to attack or drift into the right inside channel, where he has worked well with right-winger Bukayo Saka and advancing right-back Jurriën Timber. Zubimendi, as the deeper passing link, has found these advanced players thanks to his ability to break lines with his passing (below).

Leandro Trossard on the left wing has also combined well with the advancing Rice, finding him with clever passing in the final third. Viktor Gyökeres, meanwhile, has benefited from support around him from either side. Teammates making runs, or positioning themselves high – between, beside or beyond opposing centre-backs – have taken some of the heat off Gyökeres. The Swedish striker has then been able to spend more periods isolating a specific centre-back and attacking from there.

Breaking low blocks

In their first 11 Premier League games of the season, Arsenal more often than not faced compact low blocks, with opponents pressing them less than in previous seasons under Arteta. At time of writing, Arsenal ranked first for passes per defensive action (PPDA) against – a metric that measures opposition pressing intensity, with a higher number (and ranking) generally indicating a lower intensity to opposition pressing. Second, third and fourth in the rankings were West Ham, Chelsea and Liverpool, with PPDA against of 13.93, 13.87 and 13.67 respectively. Arsenal’s PPDA against was 18.05, further illustrating just how much teams had been sitting off them.  

Complementing Arsenal’s attack, centre-backs Gabriel and William Saliba have squeezed the pitch by holding a high back line. This means they can be more immediate with their defensive actions if the opposition regain the ball and look to hit the front line early. Their high positioning also helps main pivot Zubimendi to recycle the ball quickly, across and around the low block.

From here, Arsenal have shown shown flexibility in wide areas, where full-backs Timber and Riccardo Calafiori have overlapped around their respective winger. Both have provided crosses, especially if the winger has already moved inside. There have also been plenty of occasions when Calafiori has inverted from the left, during deeper build-up and when attacking against a low block. As a result, at time of writing Trossard had delivered the most crosses from Arsenal’s left, with Calafiori supporting inside.

Calafiori’s cover and support has also helped Zubimendi to circulate possession, while giving Rice licence to get forward and stay high between lines when up against a low block (below). From underneath, Zubimendi’s line-breaking passing has helped Arsenal break these blocks, finding their narrowed attacking players. At time of writing Arsenal ranked second in the Premier League for the most deep completions – namely, passes targeting the space within 20 metres of the opponents’ goal.

Key coaching points for attacking a low block

• Patient decision-making is needed to maintain attacking territory and pressure.

• Quick switches of play can exploit the other side, while still looking for central gaps to penetrate through.

• Draw or drag individual defenders out of shape or line via dribbling, combinations, runs off the ball or attempts on goal.

• Take advantage of any long-range shooting opportunities.

• Deliver crosses early from wide areas, ideally first time if possible.

• Support underneath the attack to help play away from any congested pressure.

• Cover underneath the attack to limit opposing counter-attacks, keeping the opposition locked deep.

Attacking corners

As a result of having high territory for long periods when attacking low blocks, Arsenal have won a number of set-pieces because of the opposition blocking, tackling or deflecting attempts on goal. After 11 Premier League games, half of Arsenal’s 20 goals had come from corners and free-kicks. Eight were scored from corners, coming from a mix of first contact and second-phase balls. This had Arsenal on track to exceed their best season total for set-piece goals under Arteta (and set-piece coach Nicolas Jover). That is saying something, given their already impressive track record.

For their most dangerous attacking corners, Arsenal have tended to utilise two particular routines, both built around Gabriel’s central runs towards the six-yard box. The first involves placing several strong aerial duellers in between and around the opponents’ zonal cover and goalkeeper. Should the ball land in that space, Arsenal then have players in position to compete for it. Gabriel, meanwhile, steams in through the centre, sometimes guarded only by a diminutive blocker who has little to no impact on his run.

From here, further runners support either side of Gabriel, hoping to crash in front and behind, so that any type of delivery can be met. Those locking the edge of the penalty area are aggressive, with Arsenal typically using three players for this role. When using two to lock the edge, one of the usual three is then placed near the goalkeeper to disrupt, or as an extra blocker around the zonal defence. If using four, one joins late, usually toward the back post (see Myles Lewis-Skelly, below).

The second routine again has Gabriel as the main central runner, beginning alone with minimal teammates around him. The rest stack towards the back post, running across the penalty area towards the ball. This creates multiple, simultaneous blindside runs across the zonal defence – arguably the hardest movement for any player to track or deal with.

Gabriel (below) charges through the centre with his outstanding ability to evade a blocker or marker, while back-post runners crash the defensive structure from behind. This helps to free space for Gabriel to invade, but can also disrupt, nudge or bump off-balance zonal defenders. Gabriel has a significant run-up against these static defenders, who are disrupted by those coming from the back. The result is that Arsenal – not least Gabriel with his impressive leap – typically have a strong platform to attack aggressively inswinging deliveries from Rice, Saka or Martin Ødegaard.

If Gabriel isn’t the main contact, he can help the ball to teammates in strong scoring positions at the back post. Should the opposition win the first contact, because of Arsenal’s high level of disruption, any attempted clearances can lack height and/or distance. Arsenal players locking the edge of the penalty area can then secure the next phase, which has led to some outstanding goals for the Gunners.

Recovering into a 4-4-2

With an average of just 0.45 goals conceded from their opening 11 Premier League matches, Arsenal have been defensively solid and resolute. Utilising a 4-4-2 they have pressed high, as well as sitting in mid and low blocks. Their seamless shifts between various strategies, coupled with an outstanding ability to recover back into shape has been key to their defensive solidity.

From the 4-4-2, the number nine and number 10 form a traditional defensive pair in the first line, with both wingers narrowing to allow the central midfield to support on either side. This ensures Arsenal are compact through the centre. When the ball does move wide, they look to quarter the pitch as often as possible. From here, individuals jump out to apply pressure, focusing on limiting forward passes, but also trying to avoid the centre from being penetrated (below).

What helps Arsenal is their ability to delay progress in moments where gaps or spaces may have opened up. When the opposition have passed across the pitch and connected to a deeper pivot, Arsenal’s nine and 10 have frequently demonstrated a fantastic ability to work back underneath the ball. When many forwards would simply watch the opposition play forward, Arsenal’s front line regularly attempt to recover across, forcing play backwards or sideways.

Within their 4-4-2, this gives Arsenal’s central-midfield pair time to shift over. The initially narrow winger can then move wider without the opposing full-back taking the space and receiving unattached on the outside.

When an Arsenal winger narrows and their full-back aggressively jumps out, a central midfielder will recover back to give extra protection to the wide jump. If the front line forces the opposition to play the ball back, the cover gives the full-back time to get back into shape in the 4-4-2.

When the central midfielders are forced to engage – maybe moving out of shape or the middle line – early defensive positioning and back-pressing from the wingers helps to cover and keep Arsenal’s central protection solid. The same applies if a centre-back advances to individually press; early cover from a full-back or dropping central midfielder provides stability. Arsenal’s consistency and motivation in these defensive actions has been impressive. They clearly take great pride in their individual defending and covering for one another.

Whether it be the hunger they have for defending, for attacking set-pieces, or working to break down a low block, it is all indicative of the desire this version of Arteta’s Arsenal has to win the big prizes. Whether they do it, only time will tell, but there is no doubt they are serious contenders for major silverware once again. 

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